The Senate Standing Committee on Defence (SSCD) is presently engaged in “devising a robust defence policy that is aimed at making policy guidelines for the parliamentarians” with three objectives in mind:
*  To review current issues pertaining to defence;
*  To determine mandatory changes to the defence policy; and
*  To provide new policy guidelines for better national defence.
Its intentions are noble, but it has started the exercise from the wrong end. The first step that it must take is to assist Pakistani government to issue the war directive, which lays down policy guidelines for the armed forces.
War Directive (WD): A new WD is long overdue. Some of the main objectives it sets are:
*  The structure of Higher Defence Organisation (HDO);
*  Level and size of the armed forces;
*  War stamina to be developed;
*  War objectives to be achieved;
* Capability to be achieved within a given timeframe.
After issue of the WD, the armed forces carry out in-depth studies to evolve the defence policy based on the available resources. Once the government approves it, they evolve a joint defence strategy and the strategies of army, navy and air force.
The WD, which I inherited in 1988 as COAS, was outdated. Despite my requests to the then President and PMs, the new WD was not issued. So, the army on its own developed the new Strategy of Offensive-Defence based on the current land-air warfare concept. Through indigenisation, self-sufficiency was achieved in the production of equipment and ammunition. The army also developed a new strategy on Kashmir so that in future, it would not be drawn into the conflict unprepared, as had happened in 1965 and 1971.
Higher Defence Organisation (HDO): It plays a vital role to harmonise the war efforts of the three services. General Mohammad Sharif’s Commission Report of 1975 also justified the need for establishing the Joint Defence Command (JDC), but PM Bhutto did not approve it and paid dearly for it. As Army Chief, I pleaded with both the PMs - Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif - to establish the JDC, but they too did not listen. Nawaz thought I was seeking appointment for myself. He also paid a heavy price for his failing.
The SSCD should help the government develop the WD first and then ensure that the military comes up with appropriate defence strategies. Some of the issues, which the SSCD has discussed in the recent meeting, need to be given deeper thought.
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs): Regarding our nuclear capability, it must be remembered that WMDs are “not weapons of war.” They could not save the Soviet Union from disintegration; could not help the Israelis avert defeat at the hands of Hezbollah in 2006; or lessen the US and Nato’s pain of being defeated by the Afghan freedom fighters. They would be of no help to Pakistan either. Yet, “WMDs are great equalisers”, as it was proved in 1998, when Pakistan demonstrated its capability and the Indian Defence Minister said: “Perfect nuclear deterrence now exists between India and Pakistan.” This was precisely the purpose in Bhutto’s mind, when he declared to the world, in 1974, “to correct the balance of terror at any cost” and tasked Dr Khan to accomplish it. It was Benazir, who understood his logic and propounded the ‘policy of nuclear restraint’ in 1989, knowing well that India had the capability to develop about 60 or more atomic warheads; whereas Pakistan could hardly put together eight to ten such devices because “only a few WMDs against many can maintain the balance of terror, as of now between Pakistan and India.”
Conventional Military Forces: They are the mainstay of national defence and need to be developed, organised, equipped and trained to meet the WD demands. They keep themselves abreast of developments in the fields of technology, new doctrines, concepts and weapon systems; and change and modify their concepts and plans to maintain the required level of operational readiness.
New Military Concepts and Trends: In recent years, some significant concepts of fighting the war have been developed. These are: the asymmetric war, led by men with high motivation, and the judicious use of missiles in mass. During the last 30 years, the asymmetric war conducted by the shadow armies, led by committed believers, have humbled the mightiest of the mighty in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon. In 2006, the use of missiles in mass, in Lebanon, knocked-off the pride of the Israeli Army. Israel is now threatening war on Iran, but is deterred because of the dread that there is no defence against the thousands of missiles, which would be raining over its territory in retaliation from Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas.
Pakistan Army’s Overstretch: Whenever called in aid of civil power, the army has delivered by establishing the government’s writ in areas where it was lost. But invariably, successive governments failed to establish civil order in those areas and the political process never started. It happened four times in Balochistan: in 1958-68 Ayub era; 1974-77 Bhutto era; 2006-08 Musharraf era and now 2009-12 Zardari era. The army restored the government’s writ in 2009 in Swat, Dir, Bajaur, Fata and Balochistan, yet Islamabad failed to establish civil order there. Thus, for the last four years, these areas have been gradually drifting into chaos, and the army is blamed for it. The same happened in East Pakistan in 1971; where, by August 1971, the army had restored the state’s writ over the territories of East Pakistan. But the government failed to restore the political process, which resulted into a dangerous drift and downfall.
National Security Management: The SSCD should look into the need for the establishment of a national security management system, which presently does not exist in Pakistan. We do have a National Security Council, but it is more of a disaster management body than for national security. We, therefore, need a dedicated body, working 360 days a year, under the National Security Advisor, and that is answerable to the PM.
The SSCD can best assist the government to prepare the new war doctrine for the armed forces, as it is the most important instrument, determining its war preparedness. Equally important is the need to pullout the army from areas under its control for such extended period, sapping its energies and lowering its guard against real threats. Indeed, the SSCD has some hard choices to make!

The writer is a former chief of army staff. Email: friendsfoundation@live.co.uk