Following the Mumbai attacks, tensions between India and Pakistan are running high. India has been accusing Pakistan of sponsoring the assault, since the initial moments of the 60-hour standoff, which took a toll of nearly 200 lives. Unfortunately India has not provided Pakistan any evidence of its complicity, although Pakistan has taken ample actions in cracking down on the religious institutions banned by the UN Security Council, yet India claims that Pakistan has not done enough. The fact is that India is looking for a war with Pakistan. The events in the last eight years or so indicate a pattern. Post-9/11, India was keen for Pakistan to be punished along with the Taliban in Afghanistan by the International Coalition for war against terror. Pakistan's prompt support for the Coalition deflected such a move so India staged the December 13, 2001 drama of an attack on its Parliament, pinning the blame on Pakistan so that the Coalition could execute punitive action against it. When the plan backfired, India used the pretext of the Parliament attack and deployed its troops on the Indo-Pak international border, and put its navy and air force on high alert. Pakistan responded swiftly and thwarted any plans of Indian adventurism against Pakistan by placing its armed forces on vigilance. Indian forces remained on Pakistan's borders for ten months and being unable to bear the stress and strain of the prolonged deployment, withdrew the troops unconditionally. An aftermath of the 10-month vigil Operation Prakaram was the evolution of a new war-plan: "Cold Start" strategy, which is Pakistan-specific and envisages launching eight rapidly-deployable "integrated battle groups," drawn from the Navy and the Indian Air Force. These groups are supposed to be trained to make swift and hard inroads into the "enemy" territory. Backed by tank regiments, heavy artillery, missile regiments and the air force, the battle groups are capable of going for limited but lethal destruction of "enemy" territory. The Navy with its carrier-based fighters has the key role of supporting the battle groups. The idea is to destroy, not to hold or capture territory. The strikes should be "limited" and "calibrated" to ensure nuclear weapons do not come into play in any war scenario. The Indian Army feels the strategy has to change from the existing one of slow amassing of India's three strike formations - headquartered in Mathura (I Corps), Ambala (II Corps) and Bhopal (XXI Corps) - in preparation for war to these integrated battle groups. The idea is that the international community should not get the opportunity to intervene. Hence, the need for swift action emanating from a 'cold start' instead of slow mobilisation. India has tested "Cold-Start" in exercises Vijay Chakra, Brahmastra, Divya Astra and Vajra Shakti and appears to be ready to put the new strategy into practice using the Mumbai attacks as a pretext. It is cognisant of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, but feels it will achieve the desired results before Pakistan can react. However, some Hindu extremists, if Indian media is to be believed, are willing to bear the impact of nuclear attacks by Pakistan. They project that following the collateral damage; India will absorb the onslaught and build a fresh and pure society. Since Pakistan is dealing with an irrational adversary, the current state of high alert and operational readiness is imperative. Deployment of ground troops, putting Pakistan Naval Fleet in a state of vigil and placing PAF on air defence alert including cockpit stand-by and launching Combat Air Patrol sorties is a prudent action. The Indian "Guderians" are mistakenly trying to implement "Cold Start", which is a conceptual doctrine and cannot be executed by simply declaring that holding corps will be able to commence and conclude a Blitzkrieg type of campaign. They have apparently learnt the wrong lessons from the US-led allied coalition attack against Iraq in Kuwait in 1990, or the air attacks against Kososvo in 1999, or the War against Afghanistan in 2001, as well as the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In all these campaigns, the allies had not only complete Air Supremacy, but faced virtually little or no resistance in the air from their opponents. IAF does not have the resources to meet Air Defence, Air Superiority, Deep Strike, Close Air Support, Interdiction, Recce, EW etc all simultaneously. India has already lost the element of surprise; major IAF assets will have to be deployed into facing the retaliation by an operationally ready PAF, which can badly maul IAF and ruin India's machinations to destabilise Pakistan. The writer is a political and defence analyst