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| Nawaiwaqt
| Nida-i-Millat | Family
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Fatal US embrace?
DR FAROOQ HASSAN
In today's analysis, I examine some fundamental perspectives of far reaching significance for the US towards the outcome of the truly historic Pakistani elections of February 18. In a recent column on March 25, I had articulated the grim realisation that the Bush administration by visibly still supporting Musharraf was deeply offending the majority of the Pakistani people. Widespread criticism of the previous regime and, of course, also of the US administration, accompanied by local wanton acts of terrorism and sabotage had wrecked havoc in the maintenance of law and order. Since the advent of the New Year, there had been massive 17 suicide blasts in a 14 week period throughout Pakistan compared to 11 in Iraq and 4 in Afghanistan during the same period. I feared that a situation similar to that in 1980's in Iran was conceivably in the making.
If any startling endorsement of my hypothesis was needed, it arose with such abrupt, pointed and qualitative directness as to stun the even the most diehard realist. On April 2 Islamabad in an unprecedented meeting the new military chief accompanied by the country's top intelligence officers briefed the new civilian government about the strategic implications of the current security threats to Pakistan in the context of the US emphasis and pressures on Islamabad with respect to its war on terror.
Doctrinally in the context of the prevalent 'realpolitik', this occurrence is utterly reverberating. Let me therefore advert to some salient features of this conference. The COAS General Kayani gave this in-depth briefing on the country's role in the international war on terror with special reference to the ongoing military operation in tribal areas not merely to the new Prime Minister Gillani but also to the heads of coalition parties, important leadership of such political entities and recently inducted top bureaucrats by the PM including Pakistan ambassador to United States General (retd) Mahmood Ali Durrani; many such attendees until recently were in either in jail or exile having been classified by Musharraf as fugitives from justice. Secondly it was held in the PM house where the COAS had travelled with Director General Military Operations Maj Gen Nadeem Ejaz and Director General Military Intelligence Maj Gen Shujah. Thirdly there was no Musharraf in evidence. This shows that the present military establishment and the new civilian set-up have decided to embark upon policies in which the old set-up or its policies have no place. Fourthly, this meeting signified effectively the displacement of the National Security Council (NSC), created by an enactment of Musharraf against fierce opposition of the political parties. By implication and innuendo, the NSC which was to be headed by Musharraf himself became a redundancy; under the established legal norms under the doctrine of desuetude, it ceases to be of any use to him.
Simultaneously steps were taken to emphasise an end to 'militarisation' of civil bureaucracy which Musharraf had carefully designed to be at his beck and call after leaving the COAS's position. It was publicly announced on April 2 by GHQ that the head of the MI had been replaced. It is trite knowledge that before handing over the reins of top management of the army to Gen Kiyani in November 2007, Musharraf had placed his wife's nephew in this vital position which traditionally acts as the chief of army's ears and eyes. Also taking effect was the combined orders made by the GHQ and the PM that over 2000 serving army officers throughout Pakistan were being recalled within two weeks.
The contents of the briefing as known are nationalist in character, in which the army willingly wanted fresh directives from civil leadership, a departure from the existing pattern of decision-making. The COAS gave a detailed view of the role of Pakistan in the ongoing war on terror and the commitments the government had made with the US in rooting out this menace. In this context the political leadership of the country was also given a detailed briefing on the ongoing military operation in the Tribal Areas and the areas bordering Afghanistan, and other measures including the negotiations with the Tribal elders. After the briefing the military leadership took questions from the political leadership and explained the army's position about the ongoing military operation in South and North Waziristan, Swat and other troubled areas along the Afghan borders.
My sources privy to the deliberations of the briefing disclosed that their was consensus of view in both the political leadership and top military officers that Pakistan would not tolerate any direct action from America or any other state, meaning NATO, in its territorial limits and all operations and dealings in troubled areas would be dealt with by the Pakistani authorities. I further understand that there was unanimity of view that a political solution to the problem of extremism and terrorism in the Tribal Areas would be sought, while the military option would be used as a backup measure and that too would solely be managed by the country's armed forces.
In view of these latest developments, it is astonishingly still not recognised by most intellectual American analysts that it was US fatal embrace that was amongst the two foremost causations of Musharraf's downfall. True Musharraf did his best to cuddle up to Washington. But then which military ruler doesn't to assure his perpetual stay in office? Surely, as the lonely superpower it was for the US to decide upon such unholy overtures of a fascist incumbent. There is no doubt that US and its policies did become a vital ingredient of the dynamics of current constitutional crisis in Pakistan.
If any proof was needed for asserting and articulating this thesis it was provided by the noted reactions of the relevant institutions by the untimely visit of the two top US diplomats who deal with this region, Negroponte and Boucher. One has simply to look at the commentaries, news reports and analysis in local press to realise that without exception this visit was considered most inappropriate in its timing since even the new foreign minister had still to be selected. Under normal diplomatic protocols, when the deputy foreign minister of a superpower visits, he is expected to call upon his counterpart. There being none, Negroponte ended up seeing a long list of nobodies and political trouble-shooters with absolutely no influence on what lies ahead. The ruling triumvirate he met of Zardari, Sharif and Wali made it clear that he was not going to have what he came for. It was made emphatically clear that the future of the war on terror was to be determined by the parliament. Even the major US papers such as Washington Post noted as much.
These US diplomats had a two point agenda: (1) keep Musharraf and (2) continue the war against terror. In their talks they completely failed. The totality of the political ambiance was against such US expectations with which they came to Pakistan. I am baffled why an astute foreign office as that possessed by the US failed to gauge properly an evaluation of these obvious factors. In the end they received more adversary treatment from the local press and politicians which could have been avoided by a timely visitation with adequate preparation. Resultantly in the local milieu this visit became tantamount to a blatant 'invasion' and not merely interference of domestic affairs of Pakistan at a critical juncture of its history. Regrettably instead of enhancing a better understanding of the ethos of US wishes, this visit ensured the opposite by creating a backlash of public opinion against the US policies.
Since March 9, 2007 Musharraf is the most unpopular figure in the country. He has literally played havoc with the country's legal system and that of its political institutions, and the constitution. However his demeaning humiliation of the nation's judiciary and the CJ of the realm and of the legal community has earned him the abysmal degradation in the eyes of the rest of the world.
After eight years of military rule, the new legislators feel empowered by an enormous popular mandate. And they are ready to tackle unpopular policies, especially Pakistan's participation in what is called the 'War on Terror'. "We've gone through enough problems because of following different agendas of different countries - we need to follow our own agenda," said senior member of the ruling coalition while speaking to reporters outside the parliament. "Pakistan must get out of America's fatal embrace," said another in full view of the media's cameras.
During the months of November 07 to February 08 I was in Boston, Washington DC and at other big cities addressing a number of intellectual institutions and think tanks dealing with foreign policy. Amongst the major institutions I addressed were Harvard, Stanford, NPC Washington DC, American Society of International Law, and Carnegie Endowment for Peace and the Frank Bookman's torchbearer of propagation of peace, Initiatives for Change. The Council of Foreign Relations arranged an important meeting in Feb, to evaluate and to identify implications of the Pakistan elections for US foreign policy priorities with special reference to 'terrorism'. In this context the three major avenues of inquiry were seemingly:
To what extent Counter Terrorism issues determined how Pakistanis voted
What most Pakistanis (not just urban intelligentsia) find acceptable/unacceptable, and how much that converges with US approaches
Who in the new Pakistani establishment will shape Pakistan's approach to Terrorism and counterinsurgency?
In the above analysis I have already responded to many of these issues. However, I may further add that for the greater majority of Pakistanis, poor though they may, pocket book issues did not determine their voting preferences. This is admitted by even the losing King's party stalwarts.
The foremost issue for the voters was that of the CJ and the high-handed tactics used against him and the deposed judiciary. Behind this heartfelt abhorring of the treatment of the judiciary was the deep anti-regime vote which represented the hatred against the eight-year rule. The are many separate avenues of discontent under this rubric, such as the attack on Islamabad's Red Mosque and the resultant killings in various parts of the Frontier Province. Collectively these formed the basis of the voting against the King's party on February 18.
In the face of a sweeping rebuff in the elections from the two parties and their leadership that the president tried to illegally keep out of the country, it was these factors which were the emphatic reiteration of constitutionalism voted upon by the people on February 18 elections.
If any further proof is needed of this realisation it can be seen that on April 5, soon after the election of the new CM, the Frontier Assembly passed a unanimous resolution highly critical of the US directly, its war on terror demands on Pakistan and of the April 4 speech of CIA chief Hayden in Washington saying that US may well take pre-emptive action on Pakistani territory on its own if it had a justifiable reasons. The Pakistan FO spokesman came out with a similar strongly worded statement the next day against the US. It is thus clear that Pakistan is rethinking its policy towards US and Musharraf's downfall, like that of Blair recently, directly emanated from this nexus with Washington.
The writer is Barrister at Law, Attorney at Law (US) Senior Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan and Professor, Harvard University
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