We take billionaire financier George Soros up on the bet he proffered to CNNs Fareed Zakaria this week that the Iranian regime will not be there in a years time. In fact, we want to up the ante and wager that not only will the Islamic Republic still be Irans government in a years time, but that a year from now, the balance of influence and power in the Middle East will be tilted more decisively in Irans favor than it ever has been. Just a decade ago, on the eve of the 9/11 attacks, the United States had cultivated what American policymakers like to call a strong moderate camp in the region, encompassing states reasonably well-disposed toward a negotiated peace with Israel and strategic cooperation with Washington: Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the other Persian Gulf states, as well as Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey. On the other side, the Islamic Republic had an alliance of some standing with Syria, as well as ties to relatively weak militant groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. Other radical states like Saddam Husseins Iraq and Muammar al-Qaddafis Libya were even more isolated. Fast-forward to the eve of Barack Obamas inauguration as president of the United States, in January 2009. As a result of the Iraq war, the collapse of the Arab-Israeli peace process, and some fairly astute diplomacy by Iran and its regional allies, the balance of influence and power across the Middle East had shifted significantly against the United States. Scenarios for weaning Syria away from Iran were becoming ever more fanciful as relations between Damascus and Tehran became increasingly strategic in quality. Turkey, under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), was charting a genuinely independent foreign policy, including strategically consequential partnerships with Iran and Syria. Hamas and Hezbollah, legitimated by electoral successes, had emerged as decisively important political actors in Palestine and Lebanon. It was looking progressively less likely that post-Saddam Iraq would be a meaningful strategic asset for Washington and ever more likely that Baghdads most important relationships would be with Iran, Syria, and Turkey. And, increasingly, U.S. allies like Oman and Qatar were aligning themselves with the Islamic Republic and other members of the Middle Easts resistance bloc on high-profile issues in the Arab-Israeli arena as when the Qatari emir flew to Beirut a week after the 2006 Lebanon war to pledge massive reconstruction assistance to Hezbollah strongholds in the south and publicly defended Hezbollahs retention of its military capabilities. On Obamas watch, the regional balance of influence and power has shifted even further away from the United States and toward Iran and its allies. The Islamic Republic has continued to deepen its alliances with Syria and Turkey and expand its influence in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine. Public opinion polls, for example, continue to show that the key leaders in the Middle Easts resistance bloc Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Syrian President Bashar Assad, Lebanons Hassan Nasrallah, Hamass Khaled Mishaal, and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan are all vastly more popular across the region than their counterparts in closely U.S.-aligned and supported regimes in Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and Saudi Arabia. And, now, the Obama administration stands by helplessly as new openings for Tehran to reset the regional balance in its favor emerge in Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and perhaps elsewhere. Foreign Policy