KAVEH L AFRASIABI The two-day marathon talks between Iran and the Iran Six nations in Istanbul has been wrongly misinterpreted by Western media as a total failure, following the premature expressions of disappointment by the European Unions foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton. For sure, the talks did not yield any immediate results and there are serious differences between the two sides, to paraphrase a US diplomat quoted in the Western media. But, contrary to the deluge of negative commentaries, the talks neither collapsed as claimed by news agency reports, nor were they bereft of room for optimism. Indeed, Tehrans reaction, reflected in President Mahmud Ahmadinejads statement that the Iran Six talks can yield results, together with the absence of any instant rejection of a new Western proposal for nuclear fuel swap with Iran, which was unveiled in Istanbul, point at the possibility of both a follow-up meeting and perhaps even a deal. (The Iran Six consists of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council - the US, Britain, France, Russia and China, plus Germany.) Already, the fact that Ashton unnecessarily jumped the gun by her undue pessimism can be garnered by the somewhat divergent reaction of US and German diplomats. Thus, whereas some US diplomats have hinted at their interest in further talks, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle has gone further by stating that we are still prepared for talks. China has echoed a similar sentiment, reflected in an official reaction in the China News Agency that the Iran nuclear issue cannot be resolved in one meeting. Whats more, Ashtons negative comments after the two-day talks have overshadowed the positive elements of the process that included sideline meeting between Iran and the representatives of the so-called Vienna Group comprising the US, Russia, France and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding the fuel swap. The new and revised proposal calls for the out-shipment of some 2,800 kilograms of Irans low-enriched uranium (LEU) as well as 40 kilograms of its higher-grade enriched uranium in exchange for fuel rods for the Tehran medical reactor. This is more than twice the initial amount of 1,200kg envisioned in the October 2009 IAEA-draft proposal, which was enthusiastically endorsed by US President Barack Obama back then. On the surface, the gap between the new proposal and Irans own revised proposal of May 2010, known as the Tehran Declaration, which calls for the export of 1,200kg of the countrys LEU, appears to be too large to allow for a compromise. This is a gap rooted in alternative understandings of the very purpose of the swap; that is, whereas the US and its allies have tied this to the depletion of Irans stashed LEU that can be used for bomb-making purposes, Irans calculation on the other hand is simply need-based, i.e., it matches the five-to-seven-year fuel cycle for the Tehran reactor. Hypothetically, Tehran may consent to doubling the volume of its LEU slated for fuel swap, since that would provide a longer-term supply for the Tehran reactor. That means that Tehran may come back with the returned offer of 2,400kg, instead of the 2,800kg, in pursuit of a practical deal. Assuming that the West is negotiating in good faith, then there would be little if any justification for not being flexible and settling on the slightly lower figure of 2,400kg. In essence, this means that the stage is now completely set for a deal, assuming that the Wests intention is benign and based on good faith negotiation. There remains a fundamental ambiguity in the Wests approach that needs to be clarified to turn the swap deal proposal into a reality. This pertains to Irans ability to continue with its enrichment programme irrespective of the UN sanctions resolutions on Iran. Indeed, this goes to the heart of Iran Six strategy towards Iran. Is it predicated on the premise that the suspension of Irans enrichment activities is the sine qua non for any fuel swap? Or can the West live with the scenario of Iran continuing with its enrichment and, as a result, replenish in relatively short time the depleted LEU amount sent abroad? At the moment, the US and its Western allies have provided no clear answer, demonstrating instead the haphazard signs of contradictoriness and incoherence. The trouble with their approach today remains as it was back in October 2009, when Obamas approval of the swap deal met stern objections from both the Israelis and some hawkish US lawmakers and pundits, who raised the red flag that the arrangement would be tantamount to recognising Irans disputed enrichment programme. In effect, any swap deal involving the by-products of Irans banned enrichment programme would bestow a badge of legitimacy to that programme, confirming Irans viewpoint about the peaceful functional necessity of its enrichment activity. A delicate point often bypassed in Western commentaries on the swap proposals then and now is that the Western parties have never linked their offer to engage in the swap deal to any explicit demand for full suspension of the enrichment program. That means, theoretically, that a deal can be struck in the near future that would allow Iran to continue to enrich uranium at low levels, and supervised by the IAEA, in exchange for Tehrans willingness to send abroad a bulk of its accumulated LEU. In turn, such a deal would render moot the Iranian insistence for the outside worlds recognition of its right to enrich uranium, i.e., one of the preconditions set by Irans negotiators at the Istanbul talks, the other being the lifting of sanctions. In other words, Tehran could be satisfied for the time being with only an implicit, or rather tacit, approval that would fall short of an implicit recognition of Irans right, definitely something that Tehran can live with so long as it does not require a change of enrichment policy. Given all this, there is a considerable narrowing of the differences between the two sides, potentially giving rise to the optimism that the gaps between them have shifted from qualitative to merely quantitative differences and are therefore more amenable to resolution than at any time in the past. In a word, the result of Istanbul talks points us more in the direction of hope rather than hopelessness. Asia Times