Britain 'knew Saddam had destroyed WMDs'

LONDON (Agencies) - British intelligence in the days ahead of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq signalled that Saddam Husseins forces did not have the capability to deploy chemical weapons, senior officials said on Wednesday, adding that the overall intelligence picture was patchy.
Witnesses also downplayed Iraqs chances of building a nuclear weapon and addressed a government claim that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein could launch a strike with weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in 45 minutes.
The Chilcot Iraq Inquiry heard an official dossier to justify war that said Saddam could launch WMDS within 45 minutes was understood by British security circles to refer to battlefield chemical weapons and not ballistic missiles.
Intelligence information that Saddam had dismantled his weapons of WMDs programme was received by the British Foreign Office days before the then Prime Minister Tony Blair ordered the invasion of Iraq, the inquiry heard.
The revelation on the second day of the inquiry will raise fresh questions about the justification for invading Iraq in March 2003.
There had been scant new intelligence about Iraqs WMDs programme since UN inspectors left the country in 1998, although it was assumed Saddam would step up efforts to obtain such weapons, the officials said.
Tim Dowse, Head of Counter Proliferation at the Foreign Office in 2001, and William Ehrman, who was Director International Security, said they believed Iraqs nuclear weapons ambitions had been contained by sanctions.
The second day of the inquiry heard officials had been more concerned about Iraqs bid to acquire more chemical and biological weapons (CBW), although evidence suggested its arsenal had been destroyed in the 1990s.
We did in the very final days before military action receive some (intelligence) on CBW use that it was disassembled, that he might not have the munitions to deliver it, Ehrman told the inquiry.
He said other evidence, including that from UN weapons inspectors who had been in Iraq before the 2003 war, had previously backed up fears Iraqi forces had chemical and biological weapons.
The officials were also asked specifically about the government statement that Saddam could deploy WMDs within 45 minutes. It was widely believed to mean Iraq could strike against neighbouring countries, but no such weapons were found.
Dowse said when he saw the report he assumed this referred to battlefield weapons, and not missiles that could be fired at other states. I dont think we ever said that it was for use for a ballistic missile in that way, he said.
Speaking personally, when I saw the 45 minutes report, I did not give it particular significance because it didnt seem out of line with what we generally assessed to be Iraqs intentions and capabilities with regard to chemical weapons.
It subsequently took on a rather iconic status that I dont think those of us who saw the initial report really gave it. It wasnt surprising.
The officials also said while Saddam supported Palestinian groups, there was little evidence of contact between Al-Qaeda and Saddams government over the spread of WMDs. We never found any evidence that chemical or biological material had been passed by the Iraqi regime to terrorists, Ehrman said.
Dowse said Saddam and Al-Qaeda were not allies. In fact, after 9/11 we concluded that the Iraqis had actually stepped further back. They didnt want to be associated with Al-Qaeda.