COIN strategy
By S.M. Hali July 23, 2008 " The US should shift its priorities and funding to improve civil governance, build local security forces, and exploit information capabilities that have been lacking in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Based on analysis of historical insurgencies, of recent and current insurgencies, and of the general characteristics of complex insurgency, US COIN capabilities should:
" Be acceptable, not menacing, to local populations, which ultimately decide whether insurgencies succeed or fail.
" Strengthen the responsibility, authority, standing, and performance of local governments.
" Be able to prepare and enable local security forces, which are more acceptable to the population than American forces.
" Be sustainable materially, economically, and politically (again, success in COIN takes over a decade on average).
" Place "population protection" before "force protection."
" Promote law, order, and justice, and the respect for same in the population.
The report also recommends a new information-sharing architecture, Integrated Counterinsurgency Operating Network (ICON) that would foster and rely on universal cell phone use, "wikis" and video monitoring. Such a system would maintain operational security while allowing for fast-moving information among US military, intelligence, civilian, allied and local agencies.
The US should discard "pro-America" themes in favour of strengthening local government, while at the same time highlighting evidence that jihadists are failing to meet the basic needs of the local population.
Conclusion: COIN strategy may work for USA, but defence planners in Pakistan should insist on acquiring training to combat insurgency as this is one area, where our security forces lack the requisite experience.
The writer is a political and defence analyst
