The tragedy that was 5th of July

As I am a witness to some of the crucial events that changed the fate of Pakistan, I wish to narrate my experiences as Advisor in the GS Branch of GHQ. Late General Ziaul Haq used to call me frequently to brief him verbally on the state of motivation in the Army among the officers cadres as well as the perception and feelings of the civilians about his governance. This was more or less a routine affair. Sometimes I used to submit written reports but Zia, I found was rather reluctant to read. He preferred verbal assessments of the trends in the society, political, social and economic.
I recall that it was late June 1977, when he called me and asked me to give him a feedback of the young officers' reaction to what was developing against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's massive rigging in the elections and the PNA movement, which had strongly condemned the army for illegitimate support it was giving to PPP government. My spontaneous reaction to this was, that as the officer's cadre was so much worked up due to massive propaganda, my talking to them could not be of any particular use. So I told him, "Sir, why don't you personally go and talk to the young officers so that they can be pacified by directly listening to you, as to why the Army support was being given to Mr Bhutto."
His response was very surprising and even shocking. He said that he could not face his Corps Commanders and that I was advising him to talk to the young officers. He thought that I was a bit reluctant to go and address the officers. So he directly questioned: "Was I scared to go and face them?" He then cited the case of Mr Aziz Ahmed, a bureaucrat of great standing, who had addressed the officers in Multan and had to face a good deal of humiliation as the officers had put very embarrassing questions to the extent of even insulting him. General Zia thought, I was apprehending Mr Aziz Ahmed like situation. I gave him a very emphatic reply that I was not at all sacred to face them and that I was sure, I could handle them. So he asked me to proceed at once, as that I should visit Lahore Garrison, Multan and lastly Karachi. He emphasised that I should listen to them patiently and apprise him of their "exact" inner feelings.
His instruction was that I should cover these places within 3 to 4 days, come back and report to him directly. I consequently got the messages sent through GHQ that I would be addressing a cross section of young officers at the three Garrisons. At all the three place, the major feeling of the officers was that as I was the representative of GHQ, I must be supporting the policy of General Zia. But the reality they thought was that the elected government was not legitimate as it was based on massive rigging. My argument in general was that the democracy was a delicate plant and it is much easier to trample it but to rear it, takes time. I gave the example of Anglo Saxon democracy and all that kind of logic to provoke them to come out with their real feelings. No one came in to support my argument that I presented. The same situation was in Karachi (Malir), where officers were vocal and blunt. My lecture was only of 45 minutes duration. The rest was devoted to question-answer session. On the whole it was an hour and half interaction with the young officers not above the rank of Majors, a few Lt Cols were involved in the interaction.