The tragedy that was 5th of July

When my conversations ended in Karachi, I went to see the Commander 5 Corps, Lt Gen Jehanzeb Arbab, whom I knew personally. As I entered into his office, he very jovially said, "What did you find Dr?" I told him exactly what were the reactions, in all the Garrisons I had visited. I'm sure Gen Jehanzeb knew what transpired between me and the officers in Malir. He had his own representatives of Military Intelligence there to report before I reached his office. After listening to me he inquired if I would tell exactly the same to the chief. I replied, "Of course, I would." After some formal interaction, he invited me for dinner at his residence in the evening, so that we could talk more about the prevailing political situation in the country. I recall, it was July 3, when I went to his residence and while we were chatting the telephone bell rang and he went to listen to it. When he came back, I noticed that he was a bit disturbed. He told me that the call was from General Ziaul Haq and that he wanted him to leave for Rawalpindi, early morning giving the impression that there was some Emergency. What exactly was it, he did not know.
I told General Jehanzeb that my feeling was that the PNA talk was perhaps failing, which would be disastrous for the country. So, I urged him that when you go back, make sure that the politicians agree at some point for the sake of country. The talk, I insisted must not fail. I felt that the general was not so keen on that and that martial law would give him immense power and privilege.
Moreover, he said that as he had informed General Zia about me and that he (Zia) had instructed that I should also return as soon as possible. I reached Rawalpindi by evening and General Jehanzeb arrived in the morning the other day. When I reached GHQ, I received the instructions from CGS Lt Gen Abdullah Malik that a meeting of the Motivation Board was convened on July 4 in the conference room adjacent to the office of General Zia. In this meeting, all the important people in GHQ were instructed to be there.
We all sat hoping that Zia would come to preside over the meeting of the Motivation Board of which I happened to be the secretary. I was prepared to present the proceedings of the last meeting. But we waited and waited and the general never appeared. There was something fishy going-on.
However, we learnt that in his office, there were only three people intensively involved in discussion - Lt Gen K M Arif, Lt Gen Chishti and obviously Gen Zia himself. It was later revealed that the preparation for Operation Fair Play was being finalised. All of us in the GHQ were kept under the illusion of a meeting when in-fact, it was designed that we all should be confined in a room and nothing would leak out as to what was happening in the GHQ. We were in great suspense as to why General Zia was not coming. No one was prepared to go to the chief's office to find out what - exactly - was happening. When it was nearly 4 or 5 pm, I persuaded VCGS to go and find out what were the chief's instructions. He ultimately went and the message was "Gentlemen! the Troop Motivation Board meeting has been adjourned for today and the new date and time will be intimated later. You all may leave now." So after a full day of suspense, I went back to my residence.
Later in the morning around 4 or 5 AM, I got the message from very dear colleague, Col Iftikhar that there was unusual movement of troops and possibly martial law has been imposed. He also said that there was a message from the chief that I should report to GHQ as early as possible. As I drove I found the streets barren and calm - another Martial Law.
When I reached GHQ, I got the message that I should see the CGS for further instructions. Lt Gen Abdullah Malik had been appointed CGS by Bhutto to keep track of things as to what was happening in the GHQ. As I entered his room, I found that I had to go to the same Garrisons to find out what was the impact of the martial law and how the officers were reacting. I told him that there was no need to do so, I can tell exactly what would be their expressions but the chief's order had to be complied to. As I had to address the same officers again, it was very embarrassing since I had talked to them only few days age on the merits of democracy. What I would say now was an intriguing question for me. Nevertheless somehow, I faced the situation by assuring them that the martial law would be for only 90 days, and that the general will not go back on his words. New elections would be held under the army and a sound political system would be established. My contention proved wrong. The PNA negotiations had not failed and before the agreement could be signed, the army had intervened.
Retrospectively, I feel that General Zia was only implementing what the US wanted him to comply with. The idea was that General Zia could be manipulated to fight along with the mujahideen in defeating the then Soviet Union. If Bhutto would have remained in power, it would have been difficult to make him do what US interest's demanded. They had a full knowledge of the fact that Bhutto was trying to improve relations with USSR and that he had taken some concrete steps in this respect. Imposition of martial law was to serve the US interests to mobilise mujahideen to oust the Red Army from the soil of Afghanistan. Ironically these very mujahideen are now Taliban, extremists, fanatics and terrorists. To undo them and ensure that Afghanistan is made safe for the American soldiers to stay another military ruler was needed. General Musharraf came in handy to accomplish this goal. Only the role had reversed. One general played a pivotal role in mobilising the mujahideen, the other had been tasked to eliminate them, as many as possible under the so-called War On Terror.
The writer is secretary general FRIENDS
E-mail: fr786pak@isb.comsats.net.pk