The tragedy that was 5th of July

His instruction was that I should cover these places within 3 to 4 days, come back and report to him directly. I consequently got the messages sent through GHQ that I would be addressing a cross section of young officers at the three Garrisons. At all the three place, the major feeling of the officers was that as I was the representative of GHQ, I must be supporting the policy of General Zia. But the reality they thought was that the elected government was not legitimate as it was based on massive rigging. My argument in general was that the democracy was a delicate plant and it is much easier to trample it but to rear it, takes time. I gave the example of Anglo Saxon democracy and all that kind of logic to provoke them to come out with their real feelings. No one came in to support my argument that I presented. The same situation was in Karachi (Malir), where officers were vocal and blunt. My lecture was only of 45 minutes duration. The rest was devoted to question-answer session. On the whole it was an hour and half interaction with the young officers not above the rank of Majors, a few Lt Cols were involved in the interaction.

When my conversations ended in Karachi, I went to see the Commander 5 Corps, Lt Gen Jehanzeb Arbab, whom I knew personally. As I entered into his office, he very jovially said, "What did you find Dr?" I told him exactly what were the reactions, in all the Garrisons I had visited. I'm sure Gen Jehanzeb knew what transpired between me and the officers in Malir. He had his own representatives of Military Intelligence there to report before I reached his office. After listening to me he inquired if I would tell exactly the same to the chief. I replied, "Of course, I would." After some formal interaction, he invited me for dinner at his residence in the evening, so that we could talk more about the prevailing political situation in the country. I recall, it was July 3, when I went to his residence and while we were chatting the telephone bell rang and he went to listen to it. When he came back, I noticed that he was a bit disturbed. He told me that the call was from General Ziaul Haq and that he wanted him to leave for Rawalpindi, early morning giving the impression that there was some Emergency. What exactly was it, he did not know.

I told General Jehanzeb that my feeling was that the PNA talk was perhaps failing, which would be disastrous for the country. So, I urged him that when you go back, make sure that the politicians agree at some point for the sake of country. The talk, I insisted must not fail. I felt that the general was not so keen on that and that martial law would give him immense power and privilege.

Moreover, he said that as he had informed General Zia about me and that he (Zia) had instructed that I should also return as soon as possible. I reached Rawalpindi by evening and General Jehanzeb arrived in the morning the other day. When I reached GHQ, I received the instructions from CGS Lt Gen Abdullah Malik that a meeting of the Motivation Board was convened on July 4 in the conference room adjacent to the office of General Zia. In this meeting, all the important people in GHQ were instructed to be there.

We all sat hoping that Zia would come to preside over the meeting of the Motivation Board of which I happened to be the secretary. I was prepared to present the proceedings of the last meeting. But we waited and waited and the general never appeared. There was something fishy going-on.