Prosecuting the dictatorships

The dilemma facing the nation ended on August 18 when Musharraf announced his resignation. The compendium of events of this past week had climaxed on the Independence Day when all over the country witnessed through symposia and addresses that the time had finally arrived for Musharraf to say adieu to the unlawful usurpation of state powers he had amassed from the people of Pakistan since October 1999. There had been rumours that the president may announce his decision as early as during the midnight dinner on the eve of Independence Day, or perhaps within the next 48 hours. That did not occur but on August 16 the foreign minister threatened that if Musharraf did not go voluntarily by the following day, impeachment would begin. That is precisely what the still unfolding saga of events has produced.
Not unexpectedly conflicting signals of what he may do were emitted from Musharraf's small bunch of helpers left; clearly the mounting pressures of the impeachment lobby, defections and desertions in the ranks of his one-time political allies, and hectic manoeuvring by senior American and British diplomats persuaded Musharraf to go while still there was time!
Musharraf demonstrably looked hopelessly isolated since what was left by all credible accounts at that time as his last brigade of followers were: two retired brigadiers, two old lawyers who share a last name and long past their best in the legal field, a political dropout from the PPP.
Until almost the eleventh hour his advisers counselled him against stepping down and to go for the kill before the elected parliament started the impeachment process. He still had, in a demonic sort of way the option to disband the Assembly and the present government by using his powers under Article 58-2(b). I think if I can play the devil's advocate role for a moment, he could have done four things in this hypothetical scenario: i) dismiss the government as submitted under Article 58, ii) appoint an interim government of his own choice, iii) announce his resignation, and iv) refer the matter to the present Supreme Court (SC) headed by Justice Dogar. Why he chose the tamest way out, and for him certainly full of indignity is probably based on clear ground realities. First, it has been reported that when in early August one of his trusted legal friends met with Justice Dogar he informed Musharraf after that meeting that he should not expect much hope from that quarter. Second, is the role played by British diplomat Mark Lyall. He achieved this end which avoided the undertaking of such drastic steps by Musharraf by reaching an understanding with Zardari. Under this arrangement if Musharraf agreed to resign, he would be given a safe and honourable exit. Third, is the abysmal showing by Musharraf's people in Sindh. The first half-hearted attempt to bring in a no-confidence motion against the provincial government in the Sindh Assembly fizzled out when Amin Fahim failed to muster the support of more than four or five members. Such a move, potentially with the active support of the MQM and Pir Pagara, would have started the destabilisation process. In the end, Fahim's son was left with no option but to resign his Sindh cabinet post.
In this scenario, I further understand that another diabolical option was considered: to use the pretext of deteriorating law and order to dissolve the Sindh Assembly. This was to be done in the hope of starting a chain reaction. However, the potential advantages of such a move were at best unpredictable. It could be said that if such a move resulted in protest demonstrations or possible violence, the danger of things getting out of control may become real necessitating an army take over. This could be seen as a deliberate attempt to draw the army into what is essentially a constitutional battle between the incumbent ruling junta and the newly elected parliamentary forces. Finally, Musharraf even played the ultimate "reconciliation" card as well!