140,000 troops are not enough

Arif Ayub
Reports on General McChrystal’s request for a further 40,000 US troops to stabilise the situation in Afghanistan are an indicator of how precarious circumstances have become. The Taliban now have a presence in nearly 70 percent of Afghanistan, almost completely dominating the Pashtun areas. The increase in US troop deployment, if approved, would bring the strength of foreign troops in Afghanistan to nearby 140,000 - matching the Soviet presence in the eighties. However, the results of such an increase are likely to be just as dismal, particularly since the US is also committing the same mistakes as the Soviets. This is quite unfortunate because the US started its mission with the support of the international community and the majority of Afghans. However, the mission soon morphed from a nation building and counter-terrorism exercise to a counter-insurgency.
While General McChrystal’s “Initial Assessment Report” is exceptional in its analysis and recommendations, the timing is unfortunately eight years too late. What the general has recommended is what should have been done immediately after the US removal of the Taliban. However, the shift of US focus to Iraq and the almost complete absence of the massive infrastructural development expected by the Afghans have completely changed the dynamics of the ground realities. This was exhibited during the recent elections where only the massive stuffing of ballot boxes, particularly in the Pashtun areas, could ensure a ‘victory’ for President Karzai.
General McChrystal has correctly analysed that the US objective must be the population. The request for extra troops is, however, an admission that the US has so far failed to provide the necessary security umbrella under which economic development and political reconciliation could take place. Guerrilla war is predominantly a political war and the crux of its success or failure resides in the support of the population. Mao’s primer for guerrilla movements put forward the idea that guerrilla war is basically a political war with the military aspect being utilised only to reinforce a decision, which has already been won on the ground in political terms. In broad terms, military doctrine has six components. On the tangible level there are the weapons systems, the supply systems and manpower. The intangibles are space, time and will. Mao’s military problem was how to organise space so that it could be made to yield time. His political problem was how to organise time so that it could be made to yield will. Mao’s real military problem was not that of getting the war over with but that of keeping it going.