A masterful ploy at perpetuity

But all is not within the PPP co-chairman's control. In all these matters the US perspectives from Islamabad's angle are constantly visible. I understand that Washington will deliver to the prime minister several key messages including a firm assurance that US has got over its Musharraf phobia and was willing wholeheartedly to politically and economically support the new government. There would be a timeframe to test out the new leadership in Pakistan and to give them political space to do something tangible. It is said here in the States that broadly the time being given to the PPP government is six months to one year in which the Americans will patiently try to work with the civilian government, modifying their habit of issuing orders to military rulers who in turn would issue orders and get things done. The Bush administration would emphasise that decisions regarding the War On Terror should be taken keeping the interests of Pakistan's allies, their goals in view and every party must be consulted and taken into confidence on these decisions. Would this be acceptable to Zardari? Or would he to "save" himself simply pass on the buck to General Kiyani?

While top US military, intelligence and government leaders are repeatedly making their positions clear, including their annoyance at failure of Pakistan to deal with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Fata, and press for more military action, there is a sort of resigned acceptance in some influential pockets of US government policy making apparatus that if a dialogue with the militants can produce positive results, the new government should be provided the space to try this option. Washington is officially telling everyone that US is not interested in Pakistan's domestic affairs but there is a growing expectancy that the new government should exercise its authority over major domestic issues, including the economy and domestic terrorism.

But on the other hand the scepticism expressed by some, including the president of the Supreme Court Bar that Washington is not allowing the restoration of judges remains there to be evaluated by the analysts and historians at a future time. But what evidence is there for such hypothesis? That also needs to be presented by those who can in a scholarly manner. There is, however, equally no doubt the US has been seen to be doing too much of late in the domestic political affairs of Pakistan.

To reassure the new Pakistani leaders that Washington had shifted gears and changed its Musharraf-centric policy, an important list of new benefits has been prepared by the US officials, which will be revealed during the talk's with Gilani in Washington. But the fact remains that the government also has to show that it is infact in political in charge of the country. How that is possible without Nawaz Sharif being on board, is most difficult to swallow. There is also the ultimate test for Zardari of exhibiting some modicum of nationalism. Can he do so in the circumstances in which he has placed himself?

Only time will tell but it is certain that Zardari has ushered in a channel of operations through which he is aiming to perpetuate his hold over all the power bases in the country to neutralise both the army and Nawaz Sharif, the two strongest element of the society. His difficulties, as articulated above lie in the larger sense of the people of Pakistan and the perspectives outlined above with respect to the US and its manoeuvres in this region. With the US getting more and more involved in the quagmire of Afghanistan military crisis, Pakistan desperately needs an enlightened and farsighted leadership which understands the finer nuances strategic affairs.

The writer is attorney-at-law (US), barrister-at-law (UK), senior advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan, and professor Harvard University