Accountable treachery?

During this past week disturbing news about where Pakistan is currently headed have surfaced. The magnitude of mis-governance indulged in by Musharraf and the situation which has brought Zardari into the forefront of power in the "establishment" in the country is now squarely in focus of national and international media. On September 11, after there had been four incursions into the Pakistani territory in five days by US forces from across the borders of Afghanistan into the FATA areas, the COAS announced rather tersely that it was the duty of the armed forces to defend the country and would take appropriate defensive action if such incursions continued. This warning had little effect as on the very next day, the US fired missiles on a private dwelling in Miran Shah killing 12 civilians and demolishing the house. However, on the13th when US drones were again seen coming towards the Pakistani territory, the armed forces sent PAF jets in the air causing a retreat by the US drones.
The question that needs to be answered by the government in Islamabad is: did the Americans act unilaterally or was this a part of the agreed upon rules of engagement? The New York Times reported on September 11 that in July this was ordered by President Bush allowing US Special Forces "to carry out ground assaults inside Pakistan without the prior approval of the Pakistani government." In other words, without any prior information being given to Islamabad the US Commanders in Afghanistan could act without notifying the Pakistani government.
The innuendo in this report is quite alarming that "the Pakistani government had privately assented to the general concept of limited ground assaults by Special Operations forces against significant militant targets, but that it did not approve each mission." According to the Times, "the Pakistani government is quietly winking at the idea of such attacks." If one believes the Times report then there are startling reality to be faced!
There could hardly be a worse strategy. It risks inflaming the Pakistani public opinion against the US and boost the religious parties. It clearly makes the new Pakistani government look like puppets in the hands of the US, which hardly makes them popular among Pakistanis. It is equally certain that such ad hoc actions by Washington won't be successful in eliminating Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Historians of the Vietnam War might compare the strategy to President Nixon's ill-fated decision to expand the war across the border into Cambodia in search of alleged Viet Cong "sanctuaries." That policy badly failed and didn't work out well. Could it be believed that perhaps some Pakistani officials, under intense US pressure, did "wink" at this idea? From public statements, at least, it appears that Islamabad isn't happy. The larger question if Musharraf had already winked earlier when he had the chance to do so therefore requires an answer?
Support for such a treacherous perfidy vis-à-vis nationalistic feelings in Pakistan are certainly visible. Lt Gen (retd) Shahid Aziz, who served as the chief of general staff (CGS) from Oct 2001 to Dec 2003, reveals in a startling manner that the army as an institution was in complete dark about what was going on between Washington and Islamabad on the War On Terror and the GHQ and top army commanders had strongly opposed the handing over of Pakistanis to the US, but Musharraf did so on his own. General Shahid Aziz confirmed that though the office of the CGS in the GHQ was considered to be the nerve centre in the army, the GHQ did not know most of the controversial things Musharraf did, including the handing over of Pakistani nationals to the Americans.