Only political - not military - means can neutralize Afghan insurgency: Munir Akram

NEW YORK - Former Pakistan U.N. Ambassador Munir Akram Wednesday voiced concern over India's role in the proposed U.S. Afghan strategy, and said that the insurgency in Afghanistan could only be neutralized by political means, not militarily.
Speaking to an audience of students and academics, he said the induction of 17,000 additional US troops will provoke more violence. The move, which he described as "fatal weakness", had already driven the Taliban groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan into an alliance to unify their operations against U.S.-led coalition forces.
In a comprehensive critique of the strategy, which was unveiled by President Barack Obama on Friday, he said the inclusion of India in the proposed contact group, which would deal with some of Pakistans vital national security issues, would be a "huge problem".
The strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan focuses on crushing Al-Qaeda. But the former Pakistani diplomat said Al-Qaeda would be defeated only if the political oxygen of its ideology and message was cut off.
Continued reliance on the use of military force was not the answer, he said. "Intensified aerial attacks on Pakistans territory and pressure on the Pakistan Army to enlarge its operations in the frontier will evoke more terrorist retaliation in Pakistan and could erode the willingness of its government and armed forces to participate in 'Americas War.'"
"What is required is a strategy to win over the tribes and to separate the Taliban and other Islamic militants in the area from Al-Qaeda and its leaders, so that they can no longer hide in the Taliban and Pashtuns," he said while delivering a lecture at the Nassau Community College on Long Island.
"An anti-Al-Qaeda strategy must also attempt to neutralize Al-Qaedas ideological appeal in Afghanistan, Pakistan and other parts of the world from which it finds its recruits," he said while identifying
several weaknesses, gaps and contradictions in the strategy.
"It is fortunate that President Obama has stated that the new US strategy will be reviewed and modified as required," Akram said, adding
"I trust that this critique of the strategy, outlined from the Pakistani perspective, will be viewed by the concerned officials in Washington as constructive."
While welcoming the move to negotiate with the Taliban, the former Pakistani diplomat said the idea of accommodating only "moderate Taliban is unlikely to succeed, specially now that the insurgents have a momentum.
"There is no option but to open the door of negotiations to all Taliban and insurgent groups and discuss with them power-sharing arrangements at the local, provincial and ultimately national levels, he said. "It will have to include a programme for the eventual withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, perhaps timed to coincide with the creation of a genuinely Afghan national army and an effective police force."
Akram underscored the fact that al-Qaeda is separate from the Taliban, whose ambitions have so far been local.
"Al-Qaeda will be defeated and eliminated only if we can cut off the political oxygen of its ideology and message, which is that the US and West have consistently imposed injustice and suffering on Muslim peoples in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir, and so on. Until the US and the West can demonstrate that this is untrue; until fair solutions to these issues in the Muslim world can be promoted, Al-Qaedas message will continue to find resonance in the Islamic world and its stream of affiliates and sympathizers will be unending".
Akram also regretted the failure of the Strategy in excluding the India factor.
"During his election campaign, President Obama had declared that a solution to Afghanistan lay through a settlement of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. But there was no reference to Kashmir in the Obama address (on Friday). The original mandate of Special Envoy Richard Holbrook was to cover Pakistan and India. But, when announced, it was restricted to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
"Obviously, the power of the India lobby in Washington is considerable," he added.
Akram voiced concern over the strategy proposal to create a Contact Group which would include broad membership, including India.
"At some point, once Pakistan, Afghanistan and US-NATO have evolved a clear and agreed strategy and developed the requisite level of mutual trust, the induction of Afghanistans other neighbours - specially Iran, The Central Asian Republics and China would be essential to ensure regional support for Afghanistans stabilization," he said.
"Certainly, for Pakistan, Indias inclusion in the Group, which would deal with some of Pakistans vital national security issues would be a huge problem."
In his speech on "The Afghanistan-Pakistan Challenge", he also identified other weaknesses in the strategy:
-- The failure to admit US mistake of using the minority -- the Tajik-led Northern Alliance to remove the majority Pashtun-led Taliban regime in Kabul -- that alienated the Pashtun tribes and population of South and East Afghanistan and North-West Pakistan. Likewise, the strategy ignores the fact that the radicalization of Pakistans Northwest Frontier has happened directly as a result of events in Afghanistan- not the other way around.
-- Its conception of fighting and defeating Al-Qaeda is partial and almost entirely military. It is aimed at killing Al-Qaeda leaders and eliminating their safe havens. The escalating aerial strikes cause collateral civilian casualties and thereby evoke the hostility of the local populations and unify them with the Islamic insurgents.
-- Credible negotiations with the Taliban/Pashtun insurgency cannot be conducted by the present regime in Kabul which is seen as a foreign puppet. The intermediation of Saudi Arabia may be useful at a certain stage. At the outset, what may be most effective is to constitute a commission (or Jirga) of respected personalities, including Islamic scholars and tribal leaders and some of the former Muhajdeen commanders, to meet with Taliban leaders and Commanders and open discussions for an initial cessation of hostilities, to be followed by talks on other issues including power-sharing arrangements, creation of peace zones, economic development, social issues, including girls schools, drug elimination and tactical troop redeployments. A similar, though not identical, process of negotiations with the insurgency is required on Pakistans frontier regions.
-- The absence of clear steps to overcome the absence of trust and confidence between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and between the US and the two countries. Pakistans intelligence agencies and security establishment are convinced that Afghan and Indian intelligence agencies are involved in actively fomenting terrorism and violence by the so-called Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) in Balochistan and in supporting the Pakistani Taliban (The Tehrik e- Taliban Pakistan) led by Baitullah Masud.
-- The idea of inserting benchmarks for the provision of assistance is also a problem. President Obama said there will no longer be a blank cheque. This reference was particularly offensive to Pakistanis. It indicates that the US regards the relationship with Pakistan as transactional, not an alliance; that Pakistan is again- seen as hired help, rather than a valued partner. Although these benchmarks have not so far been specified, some of those indicated by American leaders have already raised hackles in Pakistan. For example, Senator John Kerry, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, mentioned as benchmarks the reform of the 1S1 and transfer of Pakistani troops from the Eastern border to the West. The US cannot presume to dictate the nature of Pakistans security structures and its defence priorities, certainly not in exchange for the modest assistance it is offering Pakistan.
"A successful strategy should be based on ground realities, strategic and achievable goals and sound and flexible tactics," Akram said in conclusion.