Fantasies, falsehoods and a forewarning

In Bob Woodward’s book, “Bush at War”, he recalls how when he (Woodward) quoted Hersh to Bush, the latter replied that Seymour Hersh was a liar! Hersh’s article “Defending the Arsenal” in The New Yorker (November 16, 2009) has predictably caused a stir in Pakistan. But this always happens after the event; after foreign journalists have been given excessive access into the corridors of power in Pakistan. So it has been with Hersh. Now the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claims Hersh has a well-known “anti-Pakistan” bias. If that is the case, then did the MFA give an official perspective on how much access Hersh should have been given in Pakistan? Did they advise the President to avoid meeting this man or did they give any official brief to the President on what to say to him on sensitive issues? Clearly, the Zardari meeting with Hersh has no reflection of the MFA or any official Pakistani position. Instead, there is a reflection of ignorance with the President declaring that our army officers are “British-trained”!
However, leaving aside these minor issues, there are two aspects that reflect the speculative and often factually incorrect nature of the piece. First, let us look at some of the inaccuracies, if not outright falsehoods. The manner in which Hersh has dealt with Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and his claims that Pakistan and the US began sensitive nuclear cooperation, reveal a preconceived mindset. The author set out to make certain points and then sought mostly unidentified sources to prove his point! This is evident because the largest single interview cited is of “Colonel Imam” whom Hersh describes as “the archetype of the disillusioned Pakistani officer”! Now anyone who knows Col Imam knows he is a maverick, with his own idiosyncratic perspective and is certainly not typical of even disillusioned army officers - although how many of those Hersh has actually met is also questionable.
But for Hersh, Imam provides a logical development to his other theory, that it is not so much a Taliban seizure of the Pakistani nukes that is worrisome to the Americans but the fear of a “mutiny” within the army with extremists believing in the Hizbul Tahrir goal of setting up a Caliphate taking control of some nuclear assets or even diverting a warhead. Talk about being far fetched given that there is no history of mutiny in the army and the organisational interest is always supreme. Also, to a large extent the prevailing culture within the army reflects, to a large extent, the leadership at any given time. Also to assume that extremism is rampant in the military because generals no longer serve alcohol to visiting journalists is a bit ridiculous. I had argued on this point long and hard with Hersh after his last visit to Pakistan, when we met abroad, but clearly when a point has to be made, it will be made despite evidence to the contrary and no matter how fanciful the “proof”!