THE army action in SWA seems to be moving along, but is also meeting stiff resistance, which implies heavy losses. Because of restricted access, no independent assessment can be made either about how the operation is proceeding or about casualties on all sides. But official reports do describe fierce street battles especially with foreign militants. In addition, while one is not sure how many of the externally-supported TTP escaped out of the war zone, there is ample evidence to show the hardship of the growing number of displaced people fleeing into neighbouring areas. There are terrible visuals of police beating IDPs who simply want food and shelter; and it is also becoming abundantly clear that the international community has been found wanting in terms of aid and assistance for these new IDPs. The state has also failed on this count despite claims to the contrary, and it is once again the local people, especially in D. I. Khan who are again opening their homes and resources, whatever little they have, for these unfortunate people. The situation also threatens to get worse because of the fast approaching winter. For all these reasons, the military, while it continues with its inroads into the area, should also be attempting to not only divide the militants but also seek the opening of a dialogue with those who are prepared to lay down their arms and accept the writ of the state. This will not only isolate the diehard militants from their support bases but will also reduce the casualties on both sides, as well as amongst the trapped civilians. After all, army action is never an end in itself but has to be followed by political strategy for peace to be restored in a lasting fashion. However, perhaps the most urgent need for wrapping up the military action quickly is to prevent the army from getting bogged down in a sort of entrenched warfare a la the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. A most disturbing factor has been the new US demand on the Pakistan military to expand Operation Rah-i-Nejat into a "multidimensional" operation expanding into Balochistan and other parts of Pakistan as well. Clearly, the US would like to keep our military stretched for its own purposes. The US also cannot be ignorant of the underlying suspicions the Baloch harbour towards any form of military action. So why would they deliberately want to create greater civil-military cleavages in Pakistan, unless that has been their intent all along. This is one of the most compelling reasons why the Pakistan military cannot allow itself to be caught in any prolonged military action within the country. If the US realises the need to talk to the "good" Taliban, why should the Pakistani state not open dialogue with those who want to talk; while the externally-supported militants are exposed for what they are: paid mercenaries targeting the Pakistani nation.