The Afghanistan-Pakistan Region (APR) finds itself in the vortex of a fast-deteriorating strategic environment as the US and its allies beat a hasty, ill-considered retreat out of the region. This portends an indeterminate, ominous and challenging endgame to the failed US Afghan campaign.
Afghanistan is in serious turmoil. The Afghan peace process was stillborn, there is no governmental writ in the country, no central authority, a literal civil war rages on uncontrolled, the economy is in a shambles, Terrorism Central generates its own threats and all regional countries seem adamant on claiming their respective pound of Afghan flesh. With no international mediation in sight, Afghanistan lies at the verge of subsidence and collapse. The challenges for the Afghans will be to stabilise their country and forestall cascading implosion and balkanisation. A Loya Jirga might help in unifying the nation and charting an acceptable and peaceful way to an all-Afghan government. The Afghan Taliban now seem poised to eventually invest in Kabul and then serve the world with a fait accompli—to be recognised as the de facto rulers of Afghanistan. That will have its own consequences too. The US has deliberately created this diabolical strategic environment, ostensibly to keep Afghanistan perpetually on the boil and hindering Chinese and Russian ingress therein. Thus, it will retain the capacity to intrude and interfere in Afghanistan-APR at will.
The US too faces many challenges as is evident from the intriguing meeting between its and Pakistan’s National Security Advisor (NSA) in Geneva. It was apparently seeking to secure its immediate interests—a peaceful withdrawal from the region, provision of air and ground lines of communication (ALOC-GLOCs) now and post-September 2021, the retention of an intimate strategic reach into the region through military bases in Pakistan, wean Pakistan away from China as it moves stridently to counter its “competitor at the global level” and finally to get Pakistan to accede to all its demands, preferably supinely.
Pakistan is already providing the required ALOC-GLOCs under the 2001 deal. Post September 2021, their availability needs to be renegotiated. Pakistan has expressed its reservations on the provision of military bases for potential operations in Afghanistan-APR. The Afghan Taliban have vociferously opposed it and promised reprisals thereto. Furthermore, if the US wants to start off its “competition with China” from Pakistan by trying to delay, disrupt and/or destroy the BRI-CPEC then that will undoubtedly be the surest and fastest way to bust the deal. The safety, security, continuity, expansion and undisturbed completion of the BRI-CPEC is Pakistan’s core national interest and is beyond all possible compromises. Period. Was then the recent meeting between the two NSAs intended to determine Pakistan’s commitment, both to the US and to China and its BRI-CPEC? Was it intended to find convergence in a possible scuttling of the BRI-CPEC? What could the US possibly offer Pakistan as a compatible quid pro quo? Should Pakistan have even considered such an option? Alarm bells were sent aringing as the Chinese Ambassador met with the Pakistani NSA Moeed Yusuf soon after his return from Geneva and sought reassurances on the BRI-CPEC, which were mercifully forthcoming. Was this then an indication that perhaps the sanctity, further expansion and the inevitability of the BRI-CPEC for Pakistan did come under serious discussion there? Finally, the US will be constrained to retain Pakistan’s willing cooperation as it would still be an influential player in Afghanistan. Will it still be able to coerce, bludgeon, induce, lure and/or dupe an “inexplicably naïve” Pakistan yet again? The China factor will be decisive, this time around!
China will most likely ease Afghanistan and Iran into the BRI-CPEC, ushering in inevitable regional interconnectivity and economic interdependence. This will give it an excellent launch-pad into the Greater Middle East Region, Europe and Africa. China’s major challenges will be to ensure the stability of Afghanistan-APR, the security and further expansion of the BRI-CPEC and countering US’ malign influence in the region, especially vis a vis Pakistan.
Russia’s main challenge will be to ensure a stable Afghanistan-APR, get an access to the Arabian Sea, exploit the BRI-CPEC to its advantage and ensure that Terrorism Central does not ever spill over into the CARs. Peripheral India will struggle to remain relevant to the Afghan endgame.
Iran’s major challenge lies in getting the JCPOA revived and all US and western sanctions on its economy, trade, especially oil removed unconditionally. That could help integrate it into the BRI-CPEC, the regional and global economies, seamlessly. A stable and peaceful Afghanistan-APR thus becomes imperative for its resurgence and reintegration in the region.
Pakistan will have to see off multiple challenges. It must stabilise and pacify the APR, help form an All-Afghan government in Kabul, neutralise all spoilers and secure its own economic lifeline, the BRI-CPEC. It must ensure that the US starts off its competition with China elsewhere. Pakistan’s biggest challenge however will be to ward off the pervasive and ubiquitous pressures from the US, its western and Arab allies, the IFIs, FATF etc on this score. It will require sublime diplomacy and masterful statecraft to steer Pakistan out of this conundrum. Without making it a zero-sum geopolitical game Pakistan must move decisively to secure its vital national interests—regardless of the cost.
This makes for a complex interplay of clashing, reinforcing, diverging and converging national interests of all the major players in the region. The biggest challenge for the CRIPT (China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey) will be to stabilise Afghanistan through their respective proxies while keeping the meddlesome US at bay. They must ensure the territorial integrity of Afghanistan and a peaceful transition to a popular all-Afghan government. Managing the aftermath of the US withdrawal is crucial for the stability of the APR and the future of the BRI-CPEC. CRIPT, as a subset of the SCO, thus must move into the vacuum, take charge of and manage the Afghan endgame, stabilise Afghanistan, return it to a viable system of governance and reintegrate it into the regional and international orders.
Time, however, is running out fast for the CRIPT—and Afghanistan.