The Afghan conundrum along with all its uncertainties is unravelling slowly but surely. The Afghan Taliban, apparently chastened by their earlier, very controversial stint in power, promise to impose a friendlier, gentler version of the Islamic Shariah this time around.
Regardless of the Afghan Taliban’s pronouncements, will history repeat itself or will Realpolitik force hither-to-fore unimaginable compromises on to the Afghan Taliban?
A number of strategic vulnerabilities and/or faultlines can be discerned in the Afghan Taliban’s current dispensation. First, their own interpretation of and adherence to the Islamic Shariah from which they draw their fundamental inspiration and guidance. In their earlier avatar they were very harsh in implementing their version of Islamic law and Shariah and were largely shunned by the international community. They profess to have been transformed now. This then raises the basic question; was their earlier interpretation and imposition of the Shariah misplaced or is this a veritable compromise? What does this change really imply? Does it mean that their interpretation of Islamic Shariah will undergo a fundamental change, a veritable paradigm shift, or will its imposition be suitably modified to conciliate domestic and international concerns? If the fundamentals of Islam are sacrosanct then how do the Afghan Taliban justify this purported transformation? Can a true interpretation of the Shariah vary under changed circumstances? Is Realpolitik trumping staunch religious beliefs and moorings? This will directly question their righteousness, their assumed moral authority, supremacy and ascendancy which is the basic foundation of their struggle. This is a chink in their armour which will come under public scrutiny, sooner than later. They will have to address and justify this dichotomy in their beliefs and practise, for all and sundry. Such questions are bound to be raised by their rank and file too, creating serious issues of command, control and smooth, trouble-free governance. Ominously, disillusioned lower tier Afghan Taliban may find cause to shift their loyalties to other militant groups like the ISIS-K, which professes and adheres to an even more extreme interpretation of the Islamic Shariah and still pines for a revival of the Caliphate.
Second, the formation of a viable, internationally acknowledged whole-of-the-nation Afghan government (including women and all ethnic and sectarian groups) is all but inevitable. Without it, the Taliban will not get the international recognition, legitimacy and credibility they crave for. They have announced an interim cabinet of sorts but it still does not reflect the very complex ethnic nature of the Afghan nation. The Afghan Taliban need experienced technocrats too, to make their government really functional and effective. The international community will only be pacified when an all-inclusive running government has been installed.
Third, the newer generation of Afghans. The Afghan Taliban must remain wary of it as it has seen relatively more civil liberties and personal freedoms, education, employment, has confronted less gender bias, experienced more emancipation and has seen at least more than a modicum of respect for human and women’s rights. This generation will resist going back under a stringent, restrictive, suffocating rule by the Afghan Taliban that limits them and their potentials under various guises. To unify the nation the Afghan Taliban will have to take them into confidence and provide them with the opportunities to progress and prosper. It will be a major task for the Afghan Taliban to balance the provision of all civil liberties and freedoms as per international norms with the simultaneous enforcement of their own version of the Islamic Shariah—though both appear to be mutually exclusive in many respects. Creating and maintaining this critical balance will define their success or failure as rulers.
Fourth, the Afghan economy. Afghanistan’s economic woes have been further vitiated by the US-led West which has promptly operationalised its leverages with the Afghan Taliban. It has withheld its foreign exchange reserves and disbursement of economic aid/loans by the IFIs. Furthermore, the rehabilitation of Afghanistan’s economy and its devastated infrastructure, food security, trade concessions, disbursement of economic aid/loans by the IFIs, investments and its assimilation into the international community et al will be subjected to the US-led West and its self-anointed future role in the region. Afghanistan’s economic fragility creates the environment for a massive tug-of-war between the US-led West and China in bringing Afghanistan into their respective spheres of influence. China and its enormous economic clout tend to not only balance things out for the Afghans but also give them viable alternatives. The Afghan Taliban however will have to navigate their way between these two global economic powers very astutely and carefully. They cannot afford to lose either.
Fifth, Terrorism Central (ISIS-K, Al Qaeda, TTP, JuA, IMU, ETIM etc). The Afghan Taliban have committed to the US that they will not allow any terrorist groups to use Afghan soil against any other country. They have still not been able to exercise any control on them, as was evident by the terrorist attack on the Kabul airport. They will have to neutralise them very speedily either through dialogue or the gun, lest they join up with the other “spoilers’ to create insurmountable problems for their embryonic government.
Sixth, the “spoilers”. These major strategic vulnerabilities create a favourable strategic environment for the “spoilers”—vengeful and spiteful India, Terrorism Central, remnants of the RAW-NDS Combine and other hostile western intelligence agencies, elements of the erstwhile ANDSF, diehard ethnic, sectarian, political opponents, warlords etc, to exploit. The Panjshir Valley’s fall might have sounded a death knell for the National Resistance Front but this does not mean an end to opposition to the Afghan Taliban rule as a whole. The US-led West can still exploit this evolving strategic environment by supporting, organising, equipping, combining, motivating and launching the “spoilers” to instigate a ferocious, widespread, unending civil war. It can give these “spoilers” the stimulus to keep the Afghan Taliban government off kilter, the country in turmoil, the region destabilised and the deeper objective of circumscribing China’s rise (and the BRI-CPEC’s further progression) largely met. The US-led West thus retains the capability and the capacity to send the region into an irreversible tailspin—at will.