The new challenge for the US military and intelligence community at hand is to accomplish President Joe Biden’s vow to fight terrorists left behind after 20 years of war in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. However, what couldn’t be achieved with the presence of large military forces from the US and NATO allies/ISAF supported by widespread military bases and very elaborate human and technical intelligence networks both on the ground as well as in the air and outer space, how on earth the same can possibly be achieved without all that paraphernalia?
Some commentators are optimistic that Washington can still maintain awareness of terrorist threats without a presence in Afghanistan. However, absent a significant change in strategy, this optimism may prove dangerous. For example, some have asked why the United States cannot simply continue to collect human intelligence through its source network built over the last 20 years. The answer by American intelligence experts is that without a presence in Afghanistan, running a reliable human intelligence network is difficult. Face-to-face conversations now require sending US agents covertly into Afghanistan or having sources transit to a neighbouring country. Moreover, many of the Afghans with whom the United States has relationships have left or are hiding from the Taliban. Finally, the degradation of the other intelligence disciplines makes it challenging to validate source reporting.
During the recently concluded testimonies in the American Congress by the US secretary defence, Chairman JCSC and Commander CENTCOM, the admission of strategic failure by the military establishment was in fact an acknowledgement of ‘the limits of hard power’ that has vainly but continually remained a mainstay of American foreign policy since the 1950s. However, the American deep state does not seem to have learnt the right lessons from a series of failures in various theatres like the Koreas, Vietnam, the Middle East and Afghanistan—not to mention misadventures in Latin America.
Apropos, the US military and intelligence community is bound to adapt its strategy for the purported mission of hunting terrorists who could not be eliminated in the longest American war by attempting to reposition existing assets and using diplomacy to develop new ones. This could require returning some of the long-range collection platforms to Central Command. Besides, shifting emphasis to diplomatic representation in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan would improve situational awareness. For that, American diplomats will attempt to induce Afghanistan’s neighbours like Pakistan, CARs and even India to allow US bases for intelligence collection. The US will be given bad advice again to further increase diplomatic and economic leverage with Pakistan as the US no longer relies on Pakistani ground routes to support its troops. However, in addition to military bases, increased covert and intelligence footprints, Pakistan will be asked to at least keep allowing an air corridor/boulevard to the USA with enhanced intelligence cooperation. As a less preferred option, the United States will try to seek new air bases in Central Asia, which means working with Russia.
In a nutshell, the US’ effort to adapt her diplomatic, military and intelligence efforts in Afghanistan is likely to include a heavy dose of diplomacy and economic incentives throughout the region to pave the way for positioning intelligence resources.
The American deep state is likely to prevail upon President Joe Biden’s administration to exert even more pressure on Pakistan to cover up their failure in Afghanistan on all fronts, to hide their mega corruption and follow up on a failed as well as incomplete agenda. While the Pakistan armed forces and intelligence services are well poised to defeat the ever evolving threats both from outside as well as from inside, the Government of Pakistan may also like to pay some heed to suggestions proffered in “Pak-US Relations: How to Bridge the Widening Gap” and “Lessons from Afghanistan Conundrum”; counter hostile intelligence agencies’ treacherous moves through proactive diplomacy. As for the US and close allies, there is now, perhaps, an opportunity to begin to end this impasse. Once attention shifts from tactical errors made in the closing weeks of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan to the drifting purpose and self-delusion of the preceding 20 years, the shock of failure in America’s longest war may provide an open moment to re-examine the lengthy list of earlier interventions and to reconsider US foreign policy in the post–Cold War era more broadly.