The joke that is "do more"

The "do more" admonition, commandment or challenge, which Pakistan has to put up with since soon after 9/11, has taken on a strikingly jarring ring. It has been endlessly repeated by the US media and officials. The latest salvo comes from General David McKiernan, US commander of 70,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan, who harps on the theme of eliminating the 'Taliban basis' within Pakistan's territory with greater efforts. His demand comes as he expects the injection of 21,000 more American troops in Afghanistan to put down the spreading insurgency and would, understandably, like to plug all possible avenues that he feels could contribute to his failure. A vast majority of the people in Pakistan consider the "do more" voices no more than a cruel joke. It should be clear to the meanest intelligence that the country, which has suffered thousands of casualties and where no place appears to be secure from terrorist attacks, could not be taking the matter lightly. Nevertheless, it cannot pursue a ruthless military operation against its own people; it has to be mindful of its backlash that is already in evidence in the form of an increasing number of suicide bombings. Another course of action would be worth trying. For General McKiernan to counsel Islamabad to put in more effort to root out the scourge from the tribal areas sounds, therefore, a bit too odd. Having been in the region, he should understand its complexities and the critical situation Pakistan is in better than the policymakers sitting in Washington and would do well to advise them to take a more realistic position. While it would be incorrect to absolve the forces that have been presiding over the country's destiny over the years from the blame of messing things up, US strategic objectives have had quite a share in bringing the situation to such a pass. As it is, the country stands at a crossroads where all available routes seem to lead to one dangerous terminal or the other. The crisis is, perhaps, worse than the one of 1971 that brutally rent the two parts of the country asunder. There are sharp divisions among as well as within the religious and liberal classes on the fundamental issue of the nature of polity the country should evolve itself into: theocratic, secular democratic or liberal democratic having a strong undercurrent of Islamic values. The general run of people, mired in the fight for survival against heavy economic odds, has remained outside the political arena; it is, at best, perplexed. No doubt, the question of choosing a particular system of governance should ordinarily be an internal responsibility. But the issue has assumed frightening proportions as a direct result of Pakistan's participation in the US-sponsored War On Terror that has cost the country precious lives and enfeebled its economy. In financial terms, the loss would run into tens of billions of dollars against which the aid the Americans have given it would look pretty meagre. As region watchers would point out, before the US chose to appear on the scene, Pakistan's tribal belt on the periphery of Afghanistan from which most of these troubles emanate was a calm place, living in relative harmony with the federation, though governed by its own laws and customs. The Americans inspired bands of young tribesmen and Muslims from different parts of the world with the spirit of jihad, recruited and trained them to fight the 'infidel' Soviets out of Afghanistan. In that mission, they found Pakistan a willing ally because of its own fears of the Russian presence next door. This factor has been cited to put the blame on Pakistan for the consequences of the geopolitical struggle between the two superpowers, but the view overlooks an important responsibility that the US had for taking care to rehabilitate in society the elements it had helped fire with religious fervour. Washington simply decided to withdraw from the area rather than play a leading role expected of it in properly winding up the socio-economic side of the operation, a role that was too difficult for Islamabad to handle single-handed. While Pakistan was left to find its feet struggling against these elements for more than a decade, the US re-entered the scene on the excuse of getting hold of Osama bin Laden, dead or alive, whom the Taliban government had refused to surrender following 9/11. But this time round, it had to fight the same forces it had brought forth and nurtured. Pakistan has to face another situation unfavourable to the US. Not merely the religious elements but a vast majority of the rest of the population as well are opposed to its presence in the region, as borne out by the various opinion polls conducted by international agencies. They are not necessarily supportive of militants; in fact, most are not. But if anyone is sympathetic to them, it is because of their cause of driving the American forces out of the region. It must be noted that there would be few dissident voices against the objective of their departure. The Pakistan government finds itself in a vice-like grip, being squeezed by the US to "do more" from one side and the growing phenomenon of militancy from the other. One should expect the US to show patience and understanding of Pakistan's problems and give it solid support to fight off the pressure from the militants. E-mail: mqkay@yahoo.co.uk