Pakistan's federal system is based on a bicameral legislature, where the Senate serves as the upper house and the National Assembly functions as the lower house. However, unlike in many countries, the National Assembly holds significantly more power in Pakistan for several reasons.
Primarily, it possesses extensive financial legislative powers, allowing it to approve fiscal decisions, such as budgets, and to pass money bills. The National Assembly comprises 342 seats, all of which are filled through direct elections by the people. This direct mandate from the populace grants it the authority to elect the Prime Minister and form the government through a vote of confidence, as well as to dissolve the government via a vote of no confidence. Consequently, the National Assembly exercises substantial control over the executive branch.
The Senate, in theory, is intended to serve as a bulwark against the tyranny of the majority, embodying an anti-majoritarian ethos by providing equal representation to all federating units. However, in Pakistan, the Senate is largely perceived as a forum for ineffectual discussions, rendering it virtually powerless and ineffectual.
The institution that is supposed to foster national cohesion by counterbalancing the numerical dominance of certain regions through equal representation has failed in its mandate. This failure necessitates the institutionalization of concentrated power and the hegemony of a particular province or federating unit. Consequently, the Senate's inability to effectively counteract regional disparities undermines its foundational purpose and exacerbates the imbalance of power within the federal structure.
The federal system in Pakistan is designed to favor provinces with larger populations, rather than considering factors such as size or economic contributions. This design is evident in the fact that the representation in the National Assembly is directly proportional to a province's population. As a result, Balochistan, which geographically spans over half of Pakistan, is allocated only 19 seats out of the 342 in the National Assembly. In the political arena, these 19 seats are a mere fraction of the total, rendering them almost insignificant.
For political parties, investing in and developing Balochistan is not a viable strategy. Even if they choose to invest, the likelihood of securing even half of these 19 seats is minimal. This is due to the deeply ingrained allegiance of the populace to their traditional leaders, the Sardars and Maliks, within the tribal system. Moreover, Balochistan's ethnic diversity, comprising Baloch, Brahui, Pashtun, Hazara, and Sindhi groups, alongside the various tribes such as Bugti, Marri, Mengal, Rind, and Jamali, underscores the political fragmentation and identity politics prevalent in the province. These dynamics, centered around ethnic and regional grievances, make it challenging for any political party to gain a significant foothold.
Consequently, from a political investment perspective, allocating resources to a smaller city in Punjab, such as Gujranwala, might yield comparable, if not superior, results compared to investing in Balochistan. This strategic consideration underscores the inherent flaws in the federal system, which disproportionately benefits more populous provinces, further entrenching regional disparities and exacerbating the marginalization of less populous but geographically significant regions like Balochistan.
In a hypothetical scenario where a new political party seeks to contest elections in Pakistan, it would quickly recognize the dominance of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) over Karachi and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) over Interior Sindh, both resulting from historical events. Similarly, the stronghold of independent candidates in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa renders both these provinces impractical for investment. Furthermore, Balochistan offers negligible political returns.
Consequently, the only province with any viable space for political manoeuvring is Punjab, which explains the higher levels of development observed there. This is also why most electoral campaigns, including street politics and rallies, are concentrated in Punjab. With 173 out of 342 seats in the National Assembly, Punjab commands a significant portion of the electorate since nearly half of Pakistan's population resides there. Remarkably, a party that invests in a relatively smaller city in Punjab, such as Faisalabad, and wins all its seats, would acquire more political power than it would by investing in Balochistan.
In Punjab, the necessary capital resources are substantially lower, and the ability to exercise scrutiny and control is enhanced. Thus, a small city in Punjab, which is literally ten times smaller than the smallest district in Balochistan, can significantly influence the political landscape, potentially determining the Prime Minister's fate. In stark contrast, the entirety of Balochistan barely makes an impact.
The lack of adequate representation in the federal system significantly deprives Balochistan of autonomy, even over its local affairs. For instance, decisions regarding major projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the Saindak Copper-Gold Project, the Hub Power Plant, the Reko Diq mine, and the Duddar Lead-Zinc Project are made by federal authorities or higher officials based in Islamabad. The development of Gwadar Port, a pivotal component of CPEC, is overseen by federal entities and Chinese companies, resulting in the displacement of local communities and fostering a perception that the benefits of such projects are not equitably distributed.
The centralized control over these projects exacerbates the marginalization of Balochistan, undermining the province's ability to govern its own resources and development initiatives. This systematic disenfranchisement erodes the trust and confidence of the local populace in the federal system. A potential remedy to address these grievances could be the implementation of a Minority Veto. Such a measure could help ensure that the interests and concerns of the Baloch people are adequately represented and safeguarded as this mechanism allows minority groups to block certain actions backed by the state if they are deemed as detrimental to the interests of that minority group.
Granting a Minority Veto would enable the Baloch to exert more influence over decisions that directly impact their region, potentially leading to more equitable development and fairer distribution of resources. This approach might also contribute to reducing the longstanding tensions and fostering greater national cohesion by addressing the underlying issues of political and economic disenfranchisement.
The National Finance Commission (NFC) Award is responsible for distributing financial resources both vertically and horizontally within Pakistan. Historically, this division of finances has been proportional to population, resulting in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) receiving only a marginal share. Consequently, private investments, which often follow public investments, have been severely limited. The central government exercises excessive control over the resources extracted from Balochistan. Although the Federal Government is keen on developing ports and airports to advance its own interests, it fails to provide basic necessities such as access to clean water in Gwadar.
The exploitation of mineral resources in Balochistan has not led to local development. Royalties and profits predominantly benefit the federal government and private companies, with nominal reinvestment in the province. Smaller provinces do not receive adequate royalties, which they are entitled to for having rightful claims over their resources. For example, the benefits from the Sandak Copper-Gold Project and the exploitation of gas in Sui have not been equitably distributed. The federal decision to allocate 5.62 percent of Punjab's finances to other provinces was perceived as inadequate, disproportionate, and symbolic, serving more as a performative gesture than a genuine attempt at equitable distribution.
The centralized control and inequitable financial distribution exacerbate the economic marginalization of Balochistan and KP. The failure to reinvest in local infrastructure and development perpetuates a cycle of underdevelopment and disenfranchisement. This systemic exploitation and inadequate compensation highlight the pressing need for a more equitable and inclusive financial framework. Establishing mechanisms that ensure fair distribution of resources and reinvestment in local communities is crucial for fostering regional development and national cohesion.
Perhaps the most significant legitimization of this issue is the Baloch security and missing persons crisis. The complexity inherent in multiple layers of governance can obscure responsibility, complicating efforts to address human rights violations and cases of missing persons.
This oppressive strategy undermines any potential for genuine dialogue and reconciliation, perpetuating a cycle of violence and mistrust. The federal government's heavy-handed approach not only fails to address the root causes of Baloch discontent but also entrenches the perception of the state as an oppressive force, alienating the Baloch people and undermining national cohesion.
