Dr Suhrab Aslam Khan Ideology function at the level of conviction among its followers and clarity of the related primary facts is a logical (or ideological) requirement. The historical facts relevant to the Pakistan Movement were not transparent until at least the late 1980s because, due to the irony of history, those facts were withheld from the view of scholars and public alike. For instance, India Wins Freedom by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad is a monumental work on the events connected with the movement. From its first edition published in 1958, different vital passages amounting to 30 pages were expurgated due to devious reasons. The usefulness of this malevolent manoeuvre having outlived its utility, the suppressed passages were included in its second edition during 1988. On this basis, acquaintance with those facts assumes a fresh and current importance. Against this backdrop, a revised view of Gandhis - known in history as the Father of India role in the partition of India becomes an imperative demand from the historical facts cited here from diverse authentic sources. The Indian leader Gandhi visited Mountbatten on the evening of June 04, 1947. Prima facia - that is, apparently - Gandhi was in a very unhappy and emotional mood, and it was apprehended by some that he might renounce the June 03, 1947, Partition Plan. Against this backdrop, the exchange that ensued between the Viceroy and his visitor reveals the essential nature of the Plan: Mountbatten tried to mollify the Mahatma by telling him that what the press called the 'Mountbatten Plan should really have been christened the 'Gandhi Plan, since all the salient ingredients were suggested to me byMr Gandhi. In response, Gandhi silently bowed his head and smiled. The credence is lent to this statement by at least four considerations:  Gandhi was the leading ideologue of the Congress, besides being its most popular leader, and had exercised his fundamentally transforming and shaping impact upon prominent Congress leaders, including Nehru. And Nehru was the principal political figure dealing with other prominent personalities and representing the Congress Party.  Mountbatten, Mieville, and Alan Campbell-Johnson, besides Menon, had adopted a deliberate style of nurturing personal bonds with Nehru, Indira Gandhi, and Patel - Menon is referred to have a special bond with Patel as his confidant. For instance, the Viceroy couple had adopted a customary style of visiting Nehru at his residence at night in an informal way, without protocol. These labours of socialisation among other reasons must have meant to reliably ascertain, albeit indirectly, Gandhis closely guarded views concerning the partition.  Mountbatten had arranged meetings with Gandhi, who promised to give the Viceroy two hours every day for the rest of the week. During this period, beginning on March 31 and continuing through to April 02, Mountbatten ought to have been able to assess and judge Gandhis attitude towards the transfer of power.  And the essential query remains, why did Gandhi publicly not renounce the Partition Plan to overturn it, in conformity with his personal conscience and high moral standards? In this connection, it is worthy of note that on April 02, 1947, during his meeting with Mountbatten - as a part of his promise to give Mountbatten two hours everyday for the remaining week - Gandhi spoke about the desirability for inviting Jinnah to form a new central government. Gandhi even volunteered to place his whole services at my [Mountbattens] disposal in trying to get the Jinnah government through first by exercising his influence with the Congress to accept it, and secondly by touring the length and breadth of the country getting all the peoples of India to accept the decision As a matter of fact, the same suggestion of central government under Jinnah was made to the Cabinet Mission during 1946 by Gandhi, however, without any meaningful outcome as a result of its utter non-pursuance by him beyond the noted lip service. With respect to Gandhis hold over the Congress, and implicitly over popular opinion, an instance during the conversation between Mountbatten and Azad is convincingly illustrative. This puts to rest the notion that Gandhi in those years had lost his hold over the Congressional leaders, as well as his ability to sway public opinion in order to put into effect his personal convictions regarding partition. On April 02, Mountbatten spoke to Azad about Gandhis suggestion for inviting Jinnah to form a new central government, which the Mahatma had personally communicated to the Viceroy earlier the same day. According to Mountbatten: in his [Azads] opinion, it [the plan to invite Jinnah to form government] was perfectly feasible of being carried out, since Gandhi could unquestionably influence the whole of Congress to accept it and work it loyally. Azad, on the same occasion, observed: Such a plan would be the quickest way to stop bloodshed and simplest way of turning over power. With all due regard, one is constrained to enquire that if Gandhi had the courage of conviction, given the well being of a large section of the Indian population involved, why did he fail to 'declare this proposition in the public and 'renounce the June 03 Partition Plan. In describing June 04 press conference that Mountbatten held the day after the announcement of June 03 Partition Plan, Philip Ziegler - Mountbattens official biographer - recorded: Mountbatten knew that Gandhi could overthrow the still fragile basis for a settlement if he chose openly to oppose it. Ziegler further noted that Gandhis support was not needed, neutrality would be enough, but could that be guaranteed? Lo and behold, guarantee of Mahatmas neutrality, if not of his support, was to come sooner than expected In the prayer meeting held the same evening on June 04, soon after Gandhi visited Mountbatten, he [Gandhi] maintained: The Viceroy had no hand in it [partition].If both of us - Hindus and Muslims - cannot agree on anything else then the Viceroy is left with no choice. Now the world knows about Mountbattens role, or hand, in the partition, but does the world know exactly about Gandhis hand in it? However, the world must endeavour to know it as truth with which Gandhi was given to experiment - title of Gandhis autobiography is My Experiments with Truth. Jaswant Singh states: Nehru told his biographer Michael Brecher that 'but if Gandhi had told us not to, [settle for partition] we would have gone on fighting, and waiting. But we accepted. We expected that partition would be temporary The writer is the chairman of the Pakistan Ideological Forum. Email: suhrabaslam@hotmail.com