A comparative study of Ukraine’s and North Korea’s diametrically opposite fortunes in nuclear affairs highlights critical geopolitical lessons.
Ukraine signed the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in December 1994. It further signed a series of bilateral agreements with Russia, giving up its claims on the Soviet-era nuclear weapons, missiles and the Black Sea Fleet in return for USD 2.5 billion of gas, oil debt cancellation and the future supply of fuel for its nuclear power plants. Ukraine’s then leadership ought to have shown better vision, strategic forethought, self-confidence and courage to fight for a much-improved deal than it did. It had immense leverage in hand to secure solemn “guarantees, as opposed to mere assurances only” for its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. In hindsight, it appears to have been a gross strategic faux pas with existential consequences for Ukraine. It had literally handed over its security and independence to external powers. Had Ukraine retained its nuclear weapons and missiles, regardless of who held the codes, it might still have deterred the then and would-be aggressors. Denuded of whatever form of nuclear deterrence it had, Ukraine has been brutalised by the Russian invasion since 2022 and now by the US’s heartless economic exploitation—a macabre pound of flesh!
North Korea, on the other hand, has been very clear in the pursuit of its vital national interests and is now an NWS. It has always been considered a pariah state by the US-led West. Its erstwhile leader, Kim Il Sung, founded its nuclear programme in 1952 by establishing the Atomic Energy Research Institute and the Academy of Sciences and by signing cooperation agreements with the then USSR. As of 2024, North Korea has 50 nuclear weapons, fissile material for 70-90 nuclear warheads, and sufficient production of fissile materials for 6-7 nuclear warheads per year. It has a vibrant ballistic missile programme and has demonstrated its acquisition/development of ICBMs, IRBMs, SRBMs, and even SLBMs. It withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and has still not signed the CTBT. It has borne unrelenting scorn, ridicule, isolation, sanctions, etc., from the US-led West but has never been subjected to wanton kinetic aggression by any of its many detractors. Even President Trump felt compelled to engage Kim Jong Un, the supreme North Korean leader, during his first term and might continue doing so even now.
The contrast in the fates of non-nuclear Ukraine and nuclear North Korea is emphatic. Ukraine, without its nuclear deterrence, has been ravaged by invasion, has ceded about 20% of its territory, and lost hundreds of thousands dead and wounded in the war, while many more have emigrated. Its once lively economy is in shambles now, and it will take eons and hundreds of billions of dollars to rebuild it, its economy and rehabilitate its people. North Korea, on the other hand, has been able to deter all sorts of kinetic aggression against it. Its nuclear deterrence surely has had the major role in ensuring its security, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.
Does this have relevance for Iran and Pakistan?
Iran has withstood unrelenting multidimensional coercion by the US-led West but has not given up on its nuclear ambitions—which it still maintains do not seek nuclear weapons! It will have analysed the widely differing fortunes of Ukraine and North Korea in global nuclear affairs and drawn the relevant lessons, conclusions and inferences. These will eventually influence its policy formulation and decision-making processes. They will also bring into serious question all “solemn guarantees and assurances” that the US could possibly proffer to it during any negotiations. Does the Ukrainian experience of security assurances (given and disregarded by the US, UK and Russia) inspire any confidence and trust in the “solemn pledges” that the US might offer Iran? Will or should Iran trust them? Furthermore, will Iran prefer to keep its security in its own hands à la North Korea, or will it place its security, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity in the hands of known hostile powers, as Ukraine did? There is a very wide credibility and trust deficit between the two antagonists. How will the chasm be bridged? The most critical unknown in regional-global geopolitics today is the fate of any negotiations between Iran and the US. Either way, it will define the most critical geopolitical, geostrategic and geoeconomic dimensions of the GMER and the world at large!
Pakistan, too, needs to draw the relevant lessons from this tale of two states—Ukraine and North Korea. It must always ensure a viable strategic balance in the subcontinent/South Asian theatres. Furthermore, it must always maintain a credible, full-spectrum deterrence capability at all times. India will always have numerical and, in some ways, technological superiority over its armed forces. This differential in conventional forces is, and will always be, equalised by Pakistan’s strategic assets—and as such, they are called “The Equalisers”. They equalise the odds against Pakistan! India now talks of kinetic operations while remaining within the nuclear overhang; this explicitly reiterates the validity of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. Under no circumstances—existential threats, sanctions, economic inducements, security and nuclear umbrellas, holier-than-thou commitments, agreements, guarantees, assurances, treaties, pacts, homilies, political compulsions, etc.—should Pakistan ever lower its guard or give up independent command and control of its nuclear assets, capacities and capabilities. It is a nuclear power and can never “unlearn” being one! Its freedom, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity all depend upon its resolute, unbending, iron politico-military will to prevail against all odds. Hark! Its resolve could be tested sooner rather than later! Is Armageddon creeping forth? (Armageddon Creeps On, by this scribe, The Nation, 30 Oct and 01 Nov 2023).
Imran Malik
The writer is a retired brigadier of the Pakistan Army. He can be reached at im.k846@gmail.com and tweets @K846Im.