Relations between Islamabad’s policy makers and the TTP are in dire straits because of the groups increasing transborder attacks from the Afghan territory. A lone shooter opened fire on the consulate general bunker on Friday, December 2nd. Although no one has yet claimed responsibility, the timeframe of the offence on Pakistan’s consulate general in Kabul clearly indicates a connection with the TTP breaking its peace accord with the Islamabad.
On December 11, at least eight Pakistani unarmed citizens were killed in a line of control dispute between Afghan forces and Pakistani border in Chaman.
The incident, and another one on December 15, reflected an increase in line of control strained relations in recent months. This has frequently resulted in the shutdown of the border checkpoint. Many cases have been provoked by Afghan forces’ resistance to Pakistan’s recently imposed stronger border controls, which include supporting documents and fingerprint scanners criteria at all five border checks between of two states.
The de facto clergy establishment of Afghan Taliban has expressed reservations about such issues. Some incidents have occurred because of disagreements over the security fence erected by Pakistan along a substantial portion of border. The border clashes have elicited a harsh response from Islamabad, which considered the Afghan side’s “unprovoked and indiscriminate fire” “uncalled for aggression,” while Prime Minister Shahbaz strongly condemned the incident.
Following that, Islamabad officials attempted to downplay the Dec 11 incident by claiming Kabul de facto clergy had apologized for the offence, while some parliamentarians urged for ‘reconciliation’ attempts between the two neighbors.
Although Islamabad officials continue to urge for increased international interaction with the Afghan government and financial assistance for Kabul in global forums, Pakistan’s own relationship with Kabul is becoming increasingly frustrating. Officials admit this privately, but the social posture is different: relations with the country’s western neighbors remain ‘normal’ and stable. Harsh statements have followed border clashes, but they claim that this is normal. Instead, they have emphasized the importance of strengthening trade relations, as evidenced by sixty sessions on public policy issues between the two nations since the Taliban took power.
However, there has been a notable shift. This was evident in a memorandum delivered by Mohammed Sadiq, Islamabad’s special representative for Afghanistan, at the Moscow Format meeting on November 16 in Russia. In a ‘progress report’ on sixteen months of Taliban rule, he said Pakistan’s and the international community’s expectations on key issues had not been met. “There is little to show” in terms of political inclusion; “women and girls’ rights appear to have regressed”; and “the footprint of terrorist organizations in Afghanistan” had yet to be eradicated.
His remarks acknowledged that, despite all of Kabul’s engagement, the ruling de facto war heads had not taken a big step, a small section on these counts. He blamed a “cascade of unmet expectations” for the lack of sufficient worldwide emergency relief to Kabul. In other words, the Taliban’s inability to fulfill three key promises that were made to the world community was exacting a price, but it was not convincing Kabul to change its behavior. The eventual visit to Kabul by the state minister for foreign policy, Hina Rabbani Khar, produced little in terms of Taliban flexibility on such critical issues. Khar conveyed Islamabad’s views as strongly as she could, but Taliban officials offered the typical assurances while making no promises.
Following the meetings, both sides issued statements that focused primarily on trade disputes and have avoided mentioning points of differences between the two countries. Merely few days that after visit, Pakistan’s ambassador and peacekeeping forces in Kabul were attacked, injuring a security guard. This incident has strained relations even more. Meanwhile, the escalation of terrorist attacks by the TTP, the insurgent group still premised in Afghanistan, persists to put the two countries’ relations to the test. The expectations of Islamabad that the Taliban’s regaining power would allow Islamabad to stabilise its shared boundary have not been met. Instead, Pakistan’s security concerns have grown as the TTP’s cross-border attacks have increased since the Taliban seized control of the country. In the last year or so, over 140 Pakistani armed officers have been killed in these attacks. A report earlier this year by the UN Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team (SMT) found that “TTP has ostensibly did benefit the most of all of foreign extremist groups in Afghanistan from the Taliban takeover”.
The TTP has continued to launch audacious attacks on Pakistani security personnel. Following the end of the ceasefire, the group threatened punitive strikes across the country. In any case, the cease-fire had never worked. The talks stalled months ago as it became completely obvious that TTP’s demands were unnegotiable. Although Kabul has urged Islamabad to revive this dialogue, there has been no longer any Pakistani willingness to do so — an acceptance that direct negotiations with the TTP only empowered the militant group and were responsible for the TTP’s comeback in Swat.
What are Pakistan’s options in the context of growing security issues emanating from Afghanistan? One, keep doing what you are doing, expand trade relations, assist Afghanistan in other ways, but raise security as well as new matters in the hopes of evoking a response from Kabul.
This, however, will produce no different results than in the past and remains to be a futile exercise.
The second option is a ‘tough’ approach, which involves carefully adjusting Pakistan’s considerable, unused leverage from either a policy of incentives and deterrents to secure the necessary response.
The third option is to develop a network of environment strategy that uses collective leverage to put pressure on Kabul. Security is a concern for all of Afghanistan’s neighbors, regardless of their other interests. The second and third alternatives are not reciprocally exclusive of each other and should be used together. Islamabad’s strategic imperative is to maintain a stable nexus with Afghanistan. However, there is room to craft a reform agenda that in an effective manner protects Islamabad’s security interests ranging between conciliation and confrontation. Henceforth, our security leaders must first acknowledge that the country’s current Afghan strategy is no longer viable.