The People’s Republic of Chi­na (PRC) demonstrates notable transparency in pursuing interna­tional order reform. In the context of its endeavors, Beijing regards under­developed and developing states as its primary allies, recogniz­ing health diplomacy as a cru­cial instrument for fostering international coalitions.

The COVID-19 outbreak has brought to light China’s capac­ity to engage in global actions. Bei­jing played a crucial role as an initial responder for third-world nations, and Chinese vaccines substantially impact­ed global immunization efforts despite their relatively low effectiveness rates. Geostrategic concerns primarily drove China’s contribution policy, with most donations allocated to neighboring and critical countries involved in the BRI. The pandemic also underscored the party-state’s capacity to advance a co­herent worldwide narrative through digital platforms. China has created a competing COVID-19 information bub­ble specifically aimed at underdevel­oped nations. China is the dominant force in this story, whereas the Western world is experiencing a fall.

The commencement of the Health Silk Road (HSR) in 2015 signified the initi­ation of a structured, centralized, and efficient approach to health diploma­cy. The stated objective of the HSR is to cultivate soft power and influence in re­gional and global health governance and enhance China as a prominent nation. The proposed initiatives encompass preventing and controlling infectious diseases, expanding health coopera­tion mechanisms, talent training and capacity building programs, Tradition­al Chinese Medicine (TCM), emergency medical assistance, health policy coor­dination, health system reform, health industry development, and health de­velopment assistance.

The COVID-19 pandemic stimulated and expedited Beijing’s HSR outreach initiatives. In 2019, China formed and broadened health collaborations with Eastern and Central European States, ASEAN, and the Arab League through China’s regional cooperation institu­tions. The outbreak of the Covid-19 pan­demic has also led to an increase in re­gional health cooperation systems in Latin America and the South Pacific. Bei­jing has endeavored to link Covid relief with the BRI’s commitments to achieve development and prosperity. However, due to political difficulties, the health cooperation format became less impor­tant, illustrating that engaging in con­versation does not always lead to sub­stantial collaboration.

Concerning multilateral outreach, China’s endeavors continue to be con­strained. In 2017, Beijing entered into a collaboration agreement with the WHO to investigate potential syner­gies with the Health Silk Road. Fur­thermore, it expressed that commu­nal human rights, such as the “right to health,” hold greater significance than individual human rights. Amidst the pandemic, China voiced its disapproval of the United States government’s COV­ID policy on several UN platforms while keeping its voluntary donations to the WHO moderate.

However, the question at hand is to what extent has China achieved success in its Covid diplomacy? Limited polling data suggests that Beijing’s COVID-19 diplomacy efforts did not foster a more favorable perception of China among Western states. According to a survey conducted by a Singaporean institute, experts from ASEAN states acknowledge China as the primary donor of COVID-19 help. However, there persists a percep­tion among experts that Beijing’s impact in the region is unfavorable. China is largely seen favorably across the Middle East and Africa, with favorability rates experiencing a small increase since the onset of the pandemic.

Beijing’s health cooperation was well-received by the majority of third-world states. They frequently supported im­portant policy stances of China in re­gional and global contexts, such as Xin­jiang and Hong Kong. Although Beijing’s policy of zero COVID is considered un­realistic, decision-makers need to rec­ognize the extent of China’s aspiration to gain other countries’ support. Under­estimating the PRC’s capacity to learn from its failures and enhance its health diplomacy would also be a mistake. Bei­jing recognizes the need to receive assis­tance from developing nations to main­tain and improve the global system. Hence, China focuses on third-world countries, positioning itself as the inher­ent ally of the developing world.

While China adopts a strategic ap­proach to health cooperation to acquire soft power, European decision-makers should adopt a similar approach and al­locate significant resources toward en­hancing visibility. Given Beijing’s empha­sis on the narrative of Western decline, European decision-makers must ad­vocate for the narrative, highlighting the West’s capacity to restore normal­cy while extending an inclusive invita­tion to developing nations. In order to address the public narrative monopoly of China, it is imperative to allocate sub­stantial resources to social media out­reach initiatives in recipient nations. The European Commission and embassies can employ social media specialists with expertise in the local digital environ­ment to promote and disseminate infor­mation regarding European health assis­tance. Ambassadors from EU members might highlight European health aid in the recipient states by publishing collab­orative pieces in local newspapers.

It is crucial to acknowledge that third-world states have acknowledged the Chi­nese accomplishment of shifting from receiving aid to becoming a supplier. Western democracies will not be warm­ly greeted when asserting moral superi­ority. An elegant answer to the top-down strategy of Beijing’s HSR could involve adopting a bottom-up method. Brussels or EU member states have the option to conduct surveys in countries receiv­ing help in order to identify the require­ments and wants of the recipients. These surveys might then be used to develop customized health cooperation initia­tives. When doing so, it is important to prioritize the tangible material interests of the receivers. Although donor coun­tries may help recipient governments at­tain their internal objectives, this will not lead them to align themselves with any one ideological faction. If the EU’s Glob­al Gateway Initiative were presented as a post-Covid economic recovery initiative, it may have a significant impact. Europe­an decision-makers may adopt a more strategic approach to health diplomacy by analyzing the interests of the recipi­ent states and utilizing health aid as a political tool for negotiation.

European states should use a multi-level approach to emulate Beijing’s strategic outreach method. At the bi­lateral level, it is imperative to priori­tize identifying pivotal states that have previously established health coopera­tion or hold significant strategic impor­tance for Europe and China. Moreover, Western policymakers should collabo­rate concurrently with states that share similar perspectives. The G7 might be appropriate for initiating transatlan­tic health outreach initiatives targeting third-world states, including the Peo­ple’s Republic of China (PRC). Health co­operation with China can be a mutual­ly beneficial and low-risk collaboration area despite their differing values.

Abu Hurrairah Abbasi
The Writer works as a Researcher with an Islamabad-based policy think tank, the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad. He can be reached at abuhurrairahah@gmail.com